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A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE COLORADO
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT:
"ACCIDENTS," "INJURIES" AND HEART ATTACK
by

MORTON GITELMAN,*

JAMES BILLINGERJ

I.

and

ROBERT PATTERSONT

INTRODUCTION

In 1963 the Colorado Legislature added a new section to the
Workmen's Compensation Act, providing legislative definitions of
two key terms in the act - "accident" and "injury." The new
section provides:
Definitions. (1) The term "accident" as used in this
chapter shall mean and include one or more determinate
act or acts of a traumatic nature, which caused an injury.
(2) The term "injury" or "injuries" as used in this chapter shall mean and include only trauma to the physical
structure of the body and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. The terms shall not be construed
to include disability or death due to natural causes occur-ring while the employee is at work.'
Many observers feel that the new amendment was intended
primarily to restrict the possibility of compensation awards in heart
attack cases. 2 An analysis of heart attack compensation cases in
Colorado (Part II of this paper), and of the statutory changes in
light of similar provisions in other states (Part III), indicates that
the new statute may not change the compensability of heart attacks,
but instead may drastically affect the outcome of cases concededly
compensable before enactment.
Tn order to appreciate the effect of the new amendment on
he-it attack cases, we must necessarily examine the sometimes
tortuous Colorado compensation cases attempting to bring the heart
attack within the statutory condition for recovery "that the injury
or death [be] . . . proximately caused by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment .... I
II.

COMPENSATION FOR HEART ATTACK IN COLORADO

A. Causation
If a heart attack could not be an injury within the meaning of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, it could never be compensable.
That simple solution, initially chosen by the Industrial Commission,
was rejected by the Supreme Court of Colorado, which said: "By
the term 'injury' is meant, not only an injury the means or cause
of which is an accident, but also any injury which is itself an acci* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver.
t Member of the Colorado Bar.
T Member of the Colorado Bar.
1CoLO. REv. STAT., § 81-2-9, Colo. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 180, §1.
2 Interview with James H. Murphy, Referee of the Colorado Industrial Com-

mission, December, 1963.

A CoLo. REV. STAT. § 81-13-2 (1953).
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dent.- 4 .The court added that there is an accident if the "result was
unexpected and unintended," and necessarily implied that whether
there was an accident is a question of law, and that the Industrial
Commission's answer
to such question is not binding upon the
5
courts of review.
This first consideration by the Supreme Court of Colorado of
the compensability of a heart attack involved the question of
whether the injury was caused by an accident, but not whether the
accident, if there was one, "arose out of" the employment. In the
landmark case of Ellerman v. Industrial Comm'n,6 the Commission
ruled that "overexertion," without the presence of an externally
produced blow or strain, or abnormal working conditions, as had
been present in the Carroll case, could not be an "accident." The
supreme court came to the rescue of the bereaved claimants, holding that if there were a heart attack due to overexertion, and if
that overexertion had arisen out of the employment, and if the
attack would not have occurred "save for such employment, then
the 'overexertion' was an 'accident.' -7
Attempting to supply some guidelines for the resolution of
future heart attack cases, the court went on to provide that whether
there was an accident was a question of law, while whether the
overexertion had arisen out of the employment (causation) was
a question of fact, to be determined by the Commission. Furthermore, by remanding the case to the Commission for a determination
of whether there had been overexertion arising out of the employment, the court logically implied that whether there was overexertion was a question of fact.
The Ellerman case marked the court's first mention of overexertion in discussing compensability of a heart attack. Although
it did not there specifically make overexertion a requirement for
an award of compensation, it did so subsequently.8 Because of the
court's many determinations of whether there was overexertion in
heart attack cases, both prior to its specific requirement of overexertion 9 and after it,10 there can be no doubt that Colorado follows
4Carroll v. Industrial
5 Ibid.
673 Colo. 20, 213 Pac.

Comm'n, 69 Colo. 473, 475, 195 Pac. 1097, 1098 (1921).
120 (1923).
7Id. at 22, 213 Pac. at 121.
8 Industrial Comm'n v. International Minerals and Chem. Corp., 132 Colo.
256, 287 P.2d 275 (1955).
9 Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 124 Colo. 217, 236 P.2d 296
(1951); United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 122 Colo.
31, 219 P.2d 315 (1950); Black Forest Fox Ranch, Inc. v. Garrett, 110
Colo. 323, 134 P.2d 332 (1943) ; Coors Porcelain Co. v. Grenfell, 109 Colo.
39, 121 P.2d 669 (1942); Industrial Comm'n v. McKenna, 106 Colo. 323, 104
P.2d 458 (1940); Wood v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Colo. 209, 66 P.2d 806
(1937); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Colo. 571,
45 P.2d 895 (1935); Ellerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Colo. 20, 213 Pac.
120 (1923).
10 Skinner v. Industrial Comm'n, 381 P.2d 253 (Colo. 1963); University of
Denver-Colorado Seminary v. Johnston, 378 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1963) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Hesler, 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428 (1962); Watson v.
Merritt, 149 Colo. 562, 369 P.2d 989 (1962); Huff v. Aetna Ins. Co., 146
Colo. 63, 360 P.2d 667 (1961); Industrial Comm'n v. Horner, 137 Colo. 368,
325 P.2d 698 (1958) ; Claimants in the Matter of the Death of Bennett v.
Durango Furniture Mart, 136 Colo. 529, 319 P.2d 494 (1957); Industrial
Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957).
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the minority rule in requiring overexertion, as opposed to mere exertion, as a condition to compensability. Compensation has been
granted in cases in which there was no overexertion, but only when
some other extraordinary circumstance, such as abnormal working
conditions, 1 or, perhaps, externally produced blows or strains to
the physical structure of the body, 12 existed. This requirement of
something out of the ordinary as a prerequisite to compensability
of heart attack cases is, of course, out of line with the requirements
for compensability of other kinds of injuries in Colorado.13
B. Overexertion
Accepting the requirement of overexertion as the rule in Colorado, we might ask, "What if the sufferer normally overexerted
himself? Is overexertion only work that is unusual by the sufferer's
own standard, or does any work that is unusually heavy by an
objective standard amount to overexertion, whether it be usual or
unusual?" Surprisingly, the court appears regularly to have followed the theory that the presence of overexertion is to be determined by the subjective test. Although it has specifically said this
only once, 14 it has consistently based its reasoning on the requirement of overexertion as measured by the subjective test.15 In the
only case that might indicate otherwise an externally produced
blow was involved,16 and the court has held that this in itself is
sufficient to establish a1Tpresumption that the heart attack arose
out of the employment.
Whether, as a practical matter, the Industrial Commission is
inclined to find the fact of overexertion more easily in cases involving habitually hard working victims' or whether the court is inclined to reverse a commission finding of no overexertion in such
cases cannot be ascertained from the cases. One might suspect that
the nature of the work has some influence in light of the harshness
of the everexertion rule coupled with the subjective test. In fact,
however, in a case that is difficult to reconcile with the general
trend of Colorado cases in more aspects than one, the court reversed
the Industrial Commission's award although the victim of the heart
attack clearly had been involved in an exertion that was unusual
to his employment. In this case, United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
11 Carroll v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1097 (1921).
12 Cf. Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957).
13 Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm's, 84 Colo. 481, 271 Pac. 617
(1928).
14 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Colo. 571, 45 P.2d
895 (1935).
15 See Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Hesler, 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428
(1962) ; Huff v. Aetna Ins. Co., 146 Colo. 63, 360 P.2d 667 (1961); Claimants in the Matter of the Death of Bennett v. Durango Furniture Mart, 136
Colo. 529, 319 P.2d 494 (1957) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111,
314 P.2d 698 (1957); Coors Porcelain Co. v. Grenfell, 109 Colo. 39, 121 P.2d
669 (1942); Wood v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Colo. 209, 66 P.2d 806 (1937).
18 See Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698
(1957).
17 Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Horner, 137 Colo. 368, 325 P.2d 698 (1958);
Industrial Comm'n of Colo. v. Hesler, 149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428 (1962).
18 See Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 124 Colo. 217, 236 P.2d
296 (1951).
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Industrial Comm'n, 9 the claimant, driver and guide of a tourist
agency's car, was the victim of a mechanical breakdown on Lookout Mountain. The car caught fire, which the claimant quickly put
out with sand he scooped from the mountainside. After finding a
telephone, telephoning twice to his office for a replacement car,
and waiting several hours, he suffered a non-fatal heart attack.
Although the court reversed the Commission's award because the
claimant's medical evidence as to whether the accident arose out
of the employment was couched in terms of possibilities, the case
is still difficult to reconcile with the trend of Colorado cases. Perhaps the statement that the court applies a subjective test of overexertion must be modified to the extent that while the court will
not use an objective test in favor of a heart attack victim, it will
do so to the detriment of the victim.
If this conclusion is correct, the United States Fid. & Guar. Co.
case is clearly out of line with the general philosophy of compensation cases, which the court has thus expressed: "[The Workmen's
Compensation Act] is highly remedial in its purpose and must be
given a liberal construction to accomplish its beneficial purposes."20
It might be well to reiterate that the requirement of overexertion
itself, besides being the minority rule 2' and inconsistent with the
philosophy cited above, is inconsistent with the Colorado rule in
cases involving other types of injuries that "to constitute an accidental injury, it is not necessary that there should be anything extraordinary occurring in or about the work itself .... "22
In reference to the possibilty of distinguishing the United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. case on any basis other than the one used, it might
be well to point out that the fatal or nonfatal nature of the Colorado cases has never altered the applicability of the law involved.
Neither, for that matter, has the particular medical nature of the
heart attack, except insofar as the question of causation is involved,
i.e., whether the particular type of heart
attack in question is likely
23
to have been due to the employment.
Our consideration has indicated that if overexertion, abnormal
working conditions, or any externally produced blow to or strain
in the physical structure of the body (other than the heart attack
itself) is present, the accident will be deemed to have arisen out of
the employment, barring the existeace of such complicating questions as whether the victim recovered from the extraordinary circumstance before the alleged accident, or whether there was an
19 122 Colo. 31, 219 P.2d 315 (1950).
20 Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 119, 314 P.2d 698, 702 (1957).
21 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 38.30 (rev. ed.
1962).
22 Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Colo. 481, 490, 271 Pac.
617,621 (1928).
23 See Skinner v. Industrial Comm'n. of Colo., 381 P.2d 253 (1963); Huff v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 146 Colo. 63, 360 P.2d 667 (1961); Marrote v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 145 Colo. 99, 357 P.2d 915 (1961); Industrial Comm'n
of Colo. v. Daniels, 124 Colo. 329, 236 P.2d 291 (1951) ; Peter Kiewit Sons'
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 124 Colo. 217, 236 P.2d 296 (1951); Black
Forest Fox Ranch v. Garrett, 110 Colo. 323, 134 P.2d 332 (1943); Coors
Porcelain Co. v. Grenfell, 109 Colo. 39, 121 P.2d 669 (1942) ; Industrial
Comm'n v. Wetz, 100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937).
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intervening cause. Of what, then, does overexertion, abnormal
working condition, or blow or strain consist?
These being questions of fact, 24 and determined by the Commission according to the singularities of each case, it is impossible
to delineate accurately the conditions that will satisfy the Commission or the court. Of course, any exertion that is unusual to the
victim's work should meet the test for overexertion.2 5 But the difficulty of foreseeing the result of litigation revolving around this
problem can be easily understood through a comparison of two
24 Ellerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Colo. 20, 213 Pac. 120 (1923).
25 United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Colo. 571, 45
P.2d 895 (1935).
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cases. In Industrial Comm'n. v. Wetz, 26 in which the decedent, a

city garage mechanic, incurred his heart attack on an unusually
cold morning, apparently while attempting to start a truck by
cranking its engine, the state supreme court reversed the Commission to find overexertion as a matter of law. Yet, in Industrial
Comm'n. v. Hesler,27 in which the decedent, a highway worker, died
of a coronary thrombosis after having considerable difficulty starting a road grader on a very cold morning, the court affirmed the
Commission's denial of an award because "starting the road grader,
even on cold mornings, was a 'normal part of the decedent's
duties.' "28 In both cases there was evidence of a prior heart condition. There was no indication in the Wetz case that starting cold
motors had been anything but normal to the decedent's duties, but
the Hesler court did not attempt to distinguish the two cases.
In the highly publicized case of University of Denver, Colo.
Seminary v. Johnston,29 the supreme court was able to avoid the
very difficult question of whether overexertion could be found in
the case of a hard-working law school dean who suffered a heart
attack while making a public address after several days of extraordinarily strenuous activities by finding 'that the speech was not
in the course of employment.
III.

"AcCIDENT" AND "INJURY" DEFINED BY STATUTE.

By defining the terms "accident" and "injury," the Colorado
Legislature has put into some doubt the status of heart attacks as
industrial accidents. Whether the overexertion rule and the subjective test will continue to be the Colorado approach depends upon
the manner in which the courts construe the new statute. To shed
some light on the question the new statute will be discussed first
in a general sense (non-heart attack cases) examining the construction of similar statutes in other jurisdictions and then as applied to
heart attack cases. The authors hope this approach will not only
illustrate the alternative interpretations that have been used but
that it will aid the courts in construing the new Colorado statute.
A. "Accident" in Other Jurisdictions
The requirement that an injury be accidental in nature to merit
workmen's compensation has been adopted either legislatively or
judicially by all but four states: California, Iowa, Massachusetts
and Rhode Island." The
Federal Employers Compensation Act
1
omits the requirement.
The Colorado act includes the accidental prerequisite in the
section which sets forth the conditions precedent to recovery:
The right to compensation provided for in this chapter, .. .
shall obtain in all cases where the following conditions occur:
(3) Where the injury or death is proximately caused by
26100 Colo. 161, 66 P.2d 812 (1937).

149 Colo. 592, 370 P.2d 428, 431 (1962).
Id. at 600, 370 P.2d at 431.
29 151 Colo. 465, 378 P.2d 830 (1963).
27
28

30 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

315

U.S.C. § 751 (Supp. Pamph. 1951-1961).

§

37.10 (rev. ed. 1962).
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accident arising out of and in the32course of his employment, and
is not intentionally self inflicted.
It appears that the legislature, in adopting the 1963 amendment,
deemed it necessary to modify the judicial construction that has
been placed upon the terms "accident" and "injury" by the Supreme
Court of Colorado. This brings us to the basic philosophical conflict
among the jurisdictions which have adopted the "accident" requirement. The principal difference in application has been whether the
sine qua non of compensation was that the cause of injury be accidental or that the result be so. Colorado clearly followed the
accidental
result theory until the new definition was adopted in
33
1963.

Two indispensable ingredients are found in the usual workmen's compensation statute - unexpectedness and a definiteness
of time, place, or cause. Professor Larson breaksdown the potential
component parts of the accident concept under the usual statutory
language to:
1. Unexpectedness
(a) Of cause
(b) Of result
2. Definite time
(a) Of cause
(b) Of result.
If both parts of both elements are present, we have the typical industrial accident; if all the elements are missing, we find the
typical occupational disease, the cause being the characteristic
harmful condition of the particular industry.34 The voluminous
litigation in the area results from the absence of one or more of the
component parts. Prior to the enactment of the 1963 Amendment,
the Supreme Court of Colorado allowed compensation in non-heart
attack cases upon the showing of an accidental result, that is, the
unexpected consequence of routine exertion arising out of and in
the course of employment.
A case in point, Wesco Elec. Co. v. Shook, 5 is worthy of examination, particularly as it may have been a factor in the accident
amendment of the Colorado statute. An electrician, in previous good
health, suffered severe pain in his back and loss of full use of a leg
when he was required to assume an unnatural position in performing his assigned work for a period of several days. The disability
subsequently was described as a herniation of an intervertebral
disc. The court reversed the denial of compensation, holding that
the electrician suffered an accident. In effect, the unexpected result
itself was the accident. Whether the same ruling would obtain under
the present statute depends upon the judical construction placed
upon the statutory language.
Colorado is the eighth state to provide a statutory definition
of the term "accident." The other seven states are Alabama, 3
COLO. REV. STAT. § 81-13-2 (1953).
Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Colo. 481, 271 Pac. 617
(1928).
34 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 37.20 (rev. ed. 1962).
35 143 Colo. 382, 353 P.2d 743 (1960).
36
ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262(i) (1958).
32
3
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Idaho, 38 Louisiana, 39 Missouri, Nebraska,
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and Nevada. 42

All but Colorado have included in their definition of "accident" the
language "an unexpected or unforseen event happening suddenly"
or words of similar import. Four states, Alabama, Missouri, Nebraska, and Nevada, require that the event must occur "suddenly
and violently." Florida and Idaho require only that event occur
"suddenly." Louisiana employs the language "suddenly or violently."
None of them have utilized language in any way identical to that
of Colorado: "One or more determinate
act or acts of a traumatic
43
nature, which caused an injury.

Examination of cases in these seven jurisdictions indicates that
Florida and Idaho adhere to the accidental result theory, while the
others require the showing of an accidental cause. The Florida
court, allowing recovery to a cook who injured her arm while
lifting a can of waffle batter, stated:
It is the unexpected and unintentional effect of the strain
or exertion that is covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law as an injury "by accident," and a literal showing
of an "accident" such as a slip, fall or misstep is not a prerequisite to recovery."
Similarly, the Idaho statute, which states:
"Accident" as used in this law, means an unexpected undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, happening
suddenly and connected with the industry in which it occurs,
and which can be definitely located as to time when and place
where it occurred, causing an injury, as defined in this law, 45
has been construed as requiring only an accidental result. The Idaho
court has said: "nothing more is required than that the harm that
plaintiff has sustained shall be unexpected. It is enough that causes
themselves known and usual, should produce a result which on a
particular occasion is neither designed nor expected. '46 In another
case, the same court held: "an 'accident' occurs in doing what the
workman habitually does if any unexpected, undesigned, unlookedfor or untoward event or mishap,
47 connected with or growing out of
the employment, takes place.
These decisions are clearly in accord with the philosophy underlying the Shook case, discussed earlier, but we submit that such
result must be contra to the legislative purpose in enacting Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 82-2-9. Had the legislature intended that the Colorado
court continue to follow the accidental result theory, it would have
had no reason to amend the act.
7

3 FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (19) (1959).
38 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-201 (1949).

LA. REv. STAT. § 23:1021 (1) (1951).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.020 (2) (Supp. 1960).
41 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151 (2) (Reissue 1960).
42 NEv. REv. STAT. § 616.020 (Supp. 1959).
43 COLO. REv. STAT. § 51-2-9, 91O. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 180, § 1.
44 Gray v. Employers Mut. L'ab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 650, 652 (Fla. 1953).
45 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-20/ (1949).

39

40

46 Aldrich v. Dole, 43 Idaho 30, 249 Pac. 87 (1926).
47 Laird v. State Highway Dept., 80 Idaho 12, 323 P.2d

1079, 1086 (1958).
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B. The Legislative Intent
This brings us to the question of just what the legislature did
have in mind when it enacted the new provision. Unfortunately, no
records are retained of the legislative debate concerning the legislation in Colorado. Although individual members of the legislature
are willing to discuss their private understanding of the meaning
of a statute, they are not competent to offer legally relevant testimony as to the intent of the legislature.
Perhaps some indication of the intent of the legislature may be
gained by comparing the draft of Senate Bill No. 255 as originally
introduced with the form of the bill ultimately enacted. The probative value of this "before and after" approach is dubious, but
courts frequently make use of such comparisons to ascertain the
intent of the legislature.
The proposed form of COLO. REV. STAT. 81-2-8 (1) contained the
language "a single or determinate act," which was amended to read
''one or more determinate act or acts." This revision may have been
in recognition of the fact that some injuries are the cumulative
result of repetitious causes, no one of which could have caused the
injury by itself. The Supreme Court of Idaho expressed itself on
that subject by stating: "The accident, need not occur at one instant, but . . . there may be repetitious causes all relatively slight

which culminate and result in as serious and fatal an injury as
though48 the disabling or lethal blow or incident occurred at one
time."
On the other hand, this "straw that broke the camel's back"
proposition has been considered and flatly rejected by the Washington court, which held: "Cumulative effect, however injurious,
is
'49
noncompensable unless it constitutes industrial disease.
The phrase, "of a sudden, tangible, and traumatic nature," in
the proposed bill was amended to "of a traumatic nature." Whether
the words "sudden" and "tangible" were deleted because they were
considered redundant or because the legislature considered the possibility of compensating an intangible trauma of some sort remains
to be seen. At the least, the door appears to be open for cases of
"emotional trauma," which we shall discuss later.
The construction to be placed upon the words "of a traumatic
nature" will be of the greatest importance in the determination of
the compensability of future cases. The state of Washington, although not providing a statutory definition of "accident," has defined the term "injury" as: "a sudden and tangible happening, of
a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and
occurring from without, and such physical conditions as result
therefrom." 50 The Washington court has held that the word "traumatic" means " 'of or pertaining to trauma' " while "trauma" is
defined as "'any injury to the body caused by violence.'-51 In a
subsequent case, involving the meaning of the entire phrase, the
48
49
5

Brown v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 60 Idaho 49, 87 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1938).
Haerling v. Department of Labor and Industries, 27 Wash. 2d 403, 301 P.2d
1078, 1080 (1956).

o WASH. REv. CODE,

§

51.08.100 (1961).

51 Metcalf v. Department of Labor and Industries, 168 Wash. 350, 11 P.2d
821,823 (1932).
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same court held that sudden and tangible happening, of a traumatic
nature, means that there must be a definite and particular happening, which5 2can be fixed at point of time, to which injury can be
attributed.
Washington does not, however, require that the violence must
emanate from an external source entirely. Thus an employee's death
from a cerebral hemorrhage, caused by the bursting of a blood
vessel as the result of hardened arteries and overexertion in sawing
a log to clear a road, was compensable within the statutory definition. The court likened the cerebral hemorrhage to a dislocated
shoulder, torn tejAdon, or sprained wrist. 53
The Washington court has also allowed compensation for heart
conditions. The elements which must be established in order to
connect death or disability from a heart condition with the employment of a decedent or claimant are an acute heart condition with
death or disability resulting therefrom, and a shock or exertion,
either great or slight, occurring in the course of employment, by
which54the heart was subjected to strain beyond its capacity to withstand.
Otl~er jurisdictions have considered the legal definition of
"trauma." The North Carolina court defined "trauma" as "injury to
the body inflicted by some form of outside force and divided into
four categories: (1) Physical trauma: caused by physical violence;
(2) Thermal trauma: caused by heat or cold; (3) Electrical trauma:
caused by electrical energy; (4) Chemical trauma: caused by
poisons," 55 while the Ohio court has stated that "the medical trauma
...is not such trauma
as is contemplated by the Workmen's Com56
pensation Law.
We feel that it may be significant that the legislature amended
the proposed language of COLO. REV. STAT. 81-2-9 (2), which read:
"The term 'injury' or 'injuries' as used in this chapter shall mean
and include only physical violence to the physical structure of the
body and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom."
(Emphasis supplied). "Physical violence" was deleted and the
Higgins v. Department of Labor and Indus., 27 Wash. 2d 816, 180 P.2d
559 (1947).
53 Ibid.
54 Cyr v. Department of Labor and Indus., 47 Wash. 2d 92, 286 P.2d 1038
(1955).
55 Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 66 S.E.2d 693 (1951).
56 Burns v. Employers Liab. Ass'n, 31 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938).
52
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word "trauma" substituted, raising the inference that the word
"trauma" was to be given a broad construction. The proposed form
of the same section continued: "The terms shall be construed to
include disability or death due to emotional trauma, traumatic
neurosis, or natural causes occurring while the employee is at work."
In the final form, "emotional trauma" and "traumatic neurosis"
were deleted and "occupational diseases" added, so that only death
due to natural causes and occupational diseases are not to be construed as "injuries." In our opinion, therefore, both emotional
trauma and traumatic neurosis may be held to be "injuries" compensable within the meaning of the statute, assuming that a causal
relationship can be shown. The two concepts may be distinguished
if we consider emotional trauma as mental stimulation causing a
nervous injury, and a traumatic neurosis as a physical trauma causing a nervous injury. Thus, a traumatic neurosis may increase or
extend a claimant's disability following an accident; the neurosis
itself is compensable.57 Since an emotional trauma lacks initial
physical contact it might be more difficult to reconcile with the act.
But as we mentioned in the discussion of the deletion of the word
"tangible," it may have been the intent of the legislature to allow
compensation for emotional trauma. Thus, where injury is sustained
as the result of fright or excitement, resulting in hysterical paralysis
or blindness,
a claim for compensation would be well worth pur5
suing.
All of the above mentioned amendments were made by the
Committee on Labor between February 19, 1963, and March 21,
1963. 59 It is unfortunate that no records were maintained of the
legislative debate concerning them.
C. Accidental Cause - The New Colorado Rule
In our opinion, it is certiin that Colorado will no longer be
able to follow the accidental result theory. Therefore we shall
examine some of the cases in accidental cause theory jurisdictions.
Missouri appears to be typical.
The Missouri statute defines the term "accident" as follows:
"The word 'accident' as used in this chapter shall, unless a different
meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean
an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the same time
objective symptoms of an injury." 0 In 1932 the Missouri court construed the word "event" as synonymous with "occurrenr," including all of the steps or connected incidents from the first cause to
the final result, and stated that an event may include both cause
and effect. 61 The same court in 1942 held that:
57 1 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 42.21-42.24 (rev. ed.
1962).
58 But see Classen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 387 P.2d 264 (Colo.
1963). A Texas court has interpreted a statute defining injury as damage
to the physical structure of the body as allowing recovery for emotional
trauma. See Bailey v. American General Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d
315 (1955).
59 Senate Journal, Forty-fourth General Assembly, First Regular Session,
State of Colorado, 1963 pp. 272 and 562-563.
80 MO. STAT. ANN. § 287.020 (2) (Supp. 1960).
81 Rinehart v. F. M. Stamper Co., 27 Mo. App. 653, 55 S.W.2d 729 (1932).

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL. XLI

S..
[T] he injury itself does not constitute the "event" or
"accident" . . . [within this section.] [W]here the employee's injury results from his exertion of force in lifting
or pulling upon some inanimate object, there must be some
unusual occurrence, such as a slip, or fall, or abnormal
strain, in order to bring the case within the contemplation
of the act [citations omitted] .62
Similar language was used in another case: "Injury ...due to necessary and customary physical exertion incident to the normal duties of the workmen ... is not an 'accident' within the Workmen's
Compensation Law. ' 63 The death of an employee caused by overexertion in the course of his employment, however, is an "accident"
compensable under the Missouri act.6 4 We feel that "event" may
be deemed synonymous with "act or acts" in the Colorado statute.
The word "suddenly" as used in defining an accident has been
held not to mean "instantaneous," so that an "accident" may consist
of a single occurrence or a series of occurrences resulting in an injury.6 5 As discussed above, in our opinion the same should hold true
in Colorado.
Although the Missouri court has consistently denied compensation for injuries arising in the normal course of employment, when
an injury is sustained as the result of an unexpected and abnormal
strain while the injured employee is engaged in doing something beyond and different from his normal routine, and not as a result of
orderly natural causes, an "accident" results within the meaning of
the act and is compensable. This has been true even though the
force which caused the abnormal strain emanated entirely from
physical exertion by the injured employee and not from sources
66 external to his body and was not accompanied by any slip or fall.
This distinction is apparent in the Missouri hernia cases. Compensation was denied to a workman who suffered a hernia while
lifting an oil barrel in the normal manner,6T and to a ditch digger
who was throwing a shovel of mud in the usual manner, without
slipping or falling,68 but was allowed to a workman who received his
hernia while removing a lug on an auto tire by an unusual method.6 9
It appears from a perusal of the cases in the accidental cause
jurisdictions that any deviation in the normal work routine or any
abnormal strain or exertion will be sufficient to show an "accident."
The tendency appears to be to award compensation where there is
the slightest justification, but it is absolutely mandatory in the accidental cause jurisdictions that the justification be shown. We expect
this to be the rule in future Colorado cases as well.
Although this construction makes recovery by an injured em62 Kendrick v. Sheffield Steel Corp., 166 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
63 Smith v. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body, St. Louis Division, 189 S.W.2d
259, 263, 264 (Mo. 1945).
64 Delille v. Holton-Seelye Co., 334 Mo. 464, 66 S.W.2d 834 (1933).
65 Vogt v. Ford Motor Co., 138 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
66 Williams v. Anderson Air Activities, 319 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
67 Higbee v. A. P. Green Fire Brick Co., 191 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945).
68 Keller v. Bechtel, McCone, Parsons Corp., 174 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. Ct. App.
1943).
69 State ex rel. United Transportz v. Blair 352 Mo. 1091, 180 S.W.2d 737
(1944).
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ployee more difficult and appears to work to the benefit of the employer, it may have unusual results where the injury is proximately
caused by the employer's negligence. A 1960 Nevada decision7 0 presents a case in point.
The Nevada act provides: "'Accident' shall be construed to
mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly and
violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time
objective symptoms of an injury."71
The plaintiff, who sought to avoid the exclusive remedy of the
act, was employed in a printing shop which was left unheated during an unseasonably cold period. She became chilled, suffered severe chest pains, was treated by her doctor and hospitalized. Subsequently, she was treated for pleurisy, then ideopathic pericarditis,
and then for systemic lupus erythemotosis. Medical testimony was
received that her being subjected to the cold while at work had triggered the disease's process. As she was unable to work as steadily
as before she became ill, her earnings were reduced from $100.00 to
$35.00 per week.
The employer relied upon a medical parallel: an injured employee had developed systemic lupus erythemotosis following exposure to the sun, which can also trigger the disease, and had been
awarded compensation 7under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work2
er's Compensation Act.
The Nevada court rejected this precedent. It found that the
federal act did not require the same standard of proof of an "accident" as did Nevada, and that the facts in the case did not constitute
an accident within the meaning of the Nevada act, lacking the elements of "suddenly and violently." Nor was the plaintiff's illness an
occupational disease, as members of the general public were as likely to contract the disease as the plaintiff. Therefore, the disease was
not compensable under the act and the plaintiff had the right to pursue a common law remedy against the employer. The court then
obligingly found that the evidence disclosed that the employer had
violated two sections of the Nevada safety code, requiring the employer to provide a safe place to work and not to permit the employee to work in an unsafe place, violation of which constituted
negligence per se. 73 It thus appears that an act that is susceptible to
too narrow a construction might well fail to provide as much protection to the employer as the legislature intended.
D. The New Act and Heart Attack Cases
The amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act enacted
in 1963 were initiated primarily by the Denver Chamber of Commerce and Colorado employers who insure themselves.74 Republi70 Smith v. Garside, 76 Nev. 378, 355 P.2d 849 (1960).
71 NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.020 (Supp. 1959).
72 Pan American Airways, Inc. v. Willard, 99 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
The Act is 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (1957).
73 Compare Jacobson v. Doan, 136 Colo. 496, 319 P.2d 975 (1957) where the
Supreme Court of Colorado made a similar determination in a case involving a loaned employee.
74 Interview with Harold Clark Thompson, counsel for the State Compensa-:
tion Insurance Fund and secretary-treasurer of the American Association
of State Compensation Insurance Funds.
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can and Democratic legislators and others who worked on the bill,
both in committee and on the floor, agree that the amendments,
Senate Bill 255, were sponsored by Republican members of the legislature with the general intent of "tightening up" the requirements
for compensability. 75 The bill contained other provisions, but one of
the most controversial, and the one most opposed by union lobbyists,
76
was the redefinition of "accident" and "injury" or "injuries.
Despite an attempt by members of the state senate's labor committee to kill the bill, it was brought to the floor of the senate and
passed, albeit amidst considerable turmoil. After debate, an amended bill was passed by both houses in an atmosphere of bipartisanship.
House member William Myrick, a Republican, led the opposition to the bill, and introduced the words pertaining to "trauma" in
the redefinitions of both "accident" and "injury." His intent was to
leave such injuries as heart attacks "'compensable
to the same extent
77
they were without the redefinitions."
Others are not so certain of the result of the redefinitions. They
think the supreme court conceivably may find that the new terms
either rule out compensability of heart attacks entirely, or make any
heart attack
compensable, whether or not it was induced by overex78
ertion.
The new definition, by equating "accident" with one or more
determinate traumatic acts causing an injury, could be read to include heart attacks caused by overexertion if overexertion is viewed
as a trauma definite as to time and space. Ordinary exertion, however, is a priori untraceable to a specific event and could never be
''one or more acts of a traumatic nature" unless the word "trauma"
is open to judicial redefinition. Referees of the Industrial Commission will treat future heart attack cases just as they have treated
past ones, unless and until the supreme court tells them to do otherwise. 79 While the Commission thinks the legislators intended to
change the result of some heart attack cases, it does not think the
words adopted in the bill will carry out that purpose.80
In contrast to the Commission's opinion of legislative intent,
however, at least one Republican proponent of the bill states that
the redefinitions, as finally approved, were neither intended to affect the compensability of heart attacks, nor will they have that result, except, possibly, in "unforeseeable and exceptional cases." 8'
7

5 Interview with State Senator Joseph B. Schieffelin, Republican, in December, 1963; interview with Representative Ted Rubin, Democrat, in December, 1963.
76 Colo. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 180, §1.
77 Interview with Representative William Myrick, Republican, in December,
1963.
78
Booklet, News and Exhibits of The American Association of State Compensation Insurance Funds, by Harold Clark Thompson, Secretary-Treasurer, July 1, 1963.
79 Interview with James H. Murphy, Referee of the Colorado Industrial Commission, December 1963.
80 Ibid.
81 Interview with State Senator Joseph B. Schieffelin, Republican, in December, 1963.

A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE
IV.

CONCLUSION

Upon a careful consideration of the new Colorado enactment, in
light of prior heart attack cases and cases from other jurisdictions
involving non-heart attack "injuries," one becomes painfully aware
that the Colorado legislators may be on the wrong track. If the legislative intent was to decrease the range of compensation for heart
attacks, such purpose may not have been accomplished by defining
"accident" and "injury." Furthermore, a more rational approach to
heart attack cases could easily be accomplished by a statute dealing
specifically
with this type of injury, as the legislature has done for
82
hernias.
If the legislative intent, on the other hand, was to "tighten up"
the requirements of the act 8 3 the new provisions may have gone too
far. By requiring traumatic acts of a determinate nature (accidental
cause) and eliminating from the concept of "injury" natural causes,
the new amendment creates an aura of doubt in cases which were
formerly compensable as a matter of routine. For example, the following types of cases were usually compensated prior to the amendment-are they no longer compensable?: (1) traumatic neurosis, including "compensation neurosis; 8s 4 (2) injuries due to sunstroke,
heat exhaustion, frostbite and freezing; 85 (3) injuries due to being
struck by lightning; 86 (4) injuries due to bacterial infection contracted by, e.g., hospital employees peculiarly exposed.
The new amendments, as can be easily seen, do more than
"tighten up"; they remove from consideration by the Industrial
Commission whole areas of cases previously compensated. The legislature probably did not consider whether this would open up the
area of tort suits against employers 87 which, of course, is one possibility resulting from removal of certain types of cases from the act.
More likely than not, however, the injuries defined out of the act by
the new amendment will go uncompensated. This result, unfortunately, flies in the face of trends toward increasing the scope of
workmen's compensation coverage thereby spreading the risk of occupational injury instead of letting the loss lie where it may fall.
A final observation is in point. The Supreme Court of Colorado,
at this writing, has not passed upon the new provisions, although
several cases are pending. In addition there is a strong movement to
repeal or re-amend the provisions in question as soon as the January 1965 legislature convenes. If this is so, the court may refrain
from interpreting the act until the legisature has acted. If the court
does consider the cases, however, we submit the language in other
jurisdictions interpreting similar phrases will be very persuasive
precedent.
82

CoLO. REv. STAT. § 81-12-11 (1953).

See note 28 supra.
Arvas v. McNeil Corp., 119 Colo. 289, 203 P.2d 906 (1949) ; National Lumber Creosoting Co. v. Kelly, 101 Colo. 535, 75 P.2d 144 (1937).
85 Gates v. Central City Opera House Ass'n, 107 Colo. 93, 108 P.2d 880 (1940).
Compare Wood v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Colo. 209, 66 P.2d 806 (1937).
86 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927).
87 See notes 73 and 76 supra.
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THE NEW DANUBE COMMISSION:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY IN
LAW AND POLITICSjSTEPHEN GOROVE*

It has been over sixteen years since the Belgrade Conference
put the finishing touches on a Moscow-dictated regime for a great
European waterway which has been the traditional prototype of
international control: the Danube River.'
The Conference, the first of its kind at which the Kremlin, and
not the Western Powers, commanded the majority of votes, opened
an entirely new chapter in the history of the Danube. It repudiated
the century-old idea of internationalization - that is, freedom of
navigation on a basis of equality for riparians and nonriparians
alike which, with respect to the Danube, became an integral part
of the public law of Europe through a series of multilateral agreements, including the treaties of Paris (1856), London (1871 and
1883), Berlin (1878), the Convention of Paris of 1921, and the peace
treaties of the First and Second World Wars - and substituted
the Soviet concept of free navigation which meant navigation under
the exclusive control of riparians, most of which were themselves
ruled by Russia. On a purely formal level, the Conference adopted
a Soviet-inspired Convention clearly reflective of the fundamental
changes which had occurred in the balance of power and patterns
of East European effective control to Russia's thorough advantage
in the wake of the Second World War. 2
t The author is grateful to Martinus Nijhoff publishers for their permission

to reproduce these materials from his book, LAW AND POLITICS OF THE
DANUBE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY, published by Martinus Nijhoff, The

Hague, 1964.
* Professor of Law and International Relations, University of Denver College

of Law.

1 The very extensive literature dealing with the history of the Danube, emphasizing the politico-legal setting, includes the following treatises: BAICOIANU, LE DANUBE (Paris, 1917); CHAMBERLAIN. THE DANUBE (Washington,
1918); DEMORGNY, LA QUESTION DU DANUBE (Paris, 1911); DUVERNOY, LE
REGIME INTERNATIONAL DU DANUBE (Paris, 1941); ENGELHARDT, DU REGIME
CONVENTIONNEL DES FLEUVES INTERNATIONAUX (Paris, 1879); HAJNAL, LE
DROIT Du DANUBE INTERNATIONAL (The Hague, 1929); KAECKENBECK, INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS
(London, 1920); MANCE, INTERNATIONAL RIVER AND
CANAL TRANSPORT
(London, 1944); VAN EYSINGA, LES FLEUVES ET LES
CANAUX INTERNATIONAUX (Leyden, 1924).
2

For official American accounts of the Belgrade Conference, see the declarations of Ambassador Cannon of Aug. 5, 7, 13 and 18, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL.
197-199, 219-223
(1948) ; see also statements by Walter A. Radius,
American delegate to the Conference, id. at 223-224, 283, 333. See
further U.S. Dep't of State, 1 DOCUMENTS AND STATE PAPERS 487-513 (1949).
For unofficial Soviet accounts, see statements by A. Y. Vishinsky, Chief
of the Soviet Delegation, at the Conference, in 3 SOVIET PRESS TRANSLATIONS
519-524 (1948) ; see also Soviet News (1948) ; July 31, pp. 1-2; Aug. 3, pp.
1-4; Aug. 4, pp. 1-2; Aug. 5, pp. 1-3; Aug. 6, pp. 1-3; Aug. 7, pp. 1-4; Aug.
9, pp. 1-2; Aug. 10, pp. 1-2; Aug. 11, pp. 1-2; Aug. 12, pp. 1-2; Aug. 13,
pp. 1-2; Aug. 16, pp. 1-2; Aug. 17, pp. 1-2; Aug. 20, pp. 1-4.
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Moscow and Washington looked in a very different light at the
Belgrade Convention. The Soviet Union characterized it as
document which fully met the interests of peace, democracy and
justice, guaranteeing for the first time genuine - and not merely
formal - equality of flags on the Danube. The views of the Western
Powers, on the other hand, were summed up in notes of protest
prompted by the first session in November 1949 of the new Danube
Commission, the principal organ brought into being by the Convention. The American note, which was typical of the others, reaffirmed the Western objections by stating that the new regime
was inadequate as a basis for freedom of navigation on the Danube
since it violated well-established concepts of international waterways, negated the provisions of the peace treaties of World War II,
denied immediate representation to Austria, made no provision for
eventual German participation, and disregarded the legitimate
interests of nonriparians with the purpose of sealing off the Danubian region from normal intercourse with the rest of the world to
the area's own direct disadvantage. 3
While Russia obviously did not need the Belgrade Convention
to place her in a dominant position in Southeastern Europe, she
felt that under the cover of this legal facade she could more efficiently monopolize the river for her own purposes. Whereas the
initial clauses paid lip service to freedom of navigation and nondiscriminatory treatment, in reality these principles were entirely
abandoned. Instead of a strong and responsible organ, similar to
the International Commission established in 1921, with authority
to regulate and undertake development of the river, the Convention
had established a Danube Commission with extremely limited
powers. 4 Control of the river reverted to each of the riparian states
On the Belgrade Conference and Convention in general, see Bartos, La
conference du Danube a Beograd, 2 YOUGOsLAviE 25 (1948); Benoist, La
conference de Belgrade sur le statut du Danube, 20 LA NAVIGATION DU RHIN
411 (1948); BOiRov, DUNAISKAA KONFERENCIA (Moscow, 1948); Imbert,
Le regime juridique actuel du Danube, 55 REVUE GENERALE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 76 (1951); Kunz, The Danube Regime and the Belgrade
Conference, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1949); Radius, The Issues at Belgrade
Were Clearly Drawn, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 384 (1948); Sinclair, The
Danube Convention of 1948, 25 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 398 (1948) ; SeidlHohenveldern, Die Belgrader Donaukonvention von 1948, 7 ARCHIV DES
VOLKERRECHTS 253 (1958); see also my article, Internationalizationof the
Danube: A Lesson in History, 8 J. PUB. L. 125, 146 (1959).
For an English text of the Belgrade Convention, see 33 U.N.T.S. 197.
3 The note also stressed that the Convention was clearly designed to enable
the Soviet Union to maintain a monopoly on Danubian commerce. Hence
the United States could not recognize the authority of the Danube Commission over any part of the river. The Soviet Government rejected the
Western protests and reiterated its view that the Danube Convention of
1948 eliminated the injustices of the past and established the jurisdiction
of the riparian states.
For the Soviet view, see 8 USSR INFORMATION BULL. 525 (1948). For the
Western notes and views and their Soviet rejection, consult 21 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 832 (1941); 3 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 34-35
(1949); 4 id.at 37 (1950).
4 The meager quasi-legislative powers of the new Danube Commission which is made up of one representative of each Danubian state (presently:
Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, the U.S.S.R. and
Yugoslavia) - seem essentially limited to the unification of regulations
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in its own sector, or more precisely to the joint Danubian shipping
companies established shortly after the war by the Kremlin and
its satellites which were operated not for the mutual advantage of
the states concerned but for the primary benefit of the Soviet
Union. 5 As a result, Stalin's Russia, through its political hegemony
over the majority of the riparians, had hopefully captured for its
own exclusive usea waterway vital to the control of East European
trade.
The brief history of the law and politics of the new Danube
Commission to date, just like that of the river itself in a much
wider developmental setting, has been a curious reflection of the
incessant operational push and pull of centrifugal and centripetal
forces, dividing and unifying men, nations and civilizations with
ever-changing intensity over the values and treasures of a great
governing river traffic and river inspection. The preponderance in Article
8 of the Belgrade Convention of such terms as "prepare," ".consult,""make
recommendations," "co-ordinate," and "publish" in connection with the Commission's statutorily assigned functions appears sufficiently to reveal its
advisory character. In contradistinction, Articles 11-17 of the Paris Convention of 1921, establishing the Definitive Statute of the Danube, gave
sweeping powers to the International Commission to draw up and supervise
a program of works for the improvement of navigation. For a text of the
Paris Convention, see Gt. Brit. T.S. (No. 16 of 1922).
Recent works discussing developments after the establishment of the
Danube Commission include: Carantino, Autour de la 5me Session de la
Conference Danubienne, 54 REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 169 (1952);
Cattell, The Politics of the Danube Commission under Soviet Control, 19
AM. SLAVIC AND EAST EUROPEAN REV. 380 (1960); FANDIKOV, MEZHDUNARODNO-PRAVOVOI REZHIM DUNAIA (Moscow, 1955); Fillitz, Die Donauschiffahrt von Einst zum Jetzt, 2 DONAURUM 164 (No. 3/4, 1957) ; Gschnitzer,
Die Donau, ein ungelostes europaischesProblem, 8 OSTERREICHISCHE MONATSHEFTE 385 (1952); Haeseler, Die internationaleRechtsregelung des Donauverkehrs, 2 OSTERREICHISCHE OST-HEFrE 251 (1960); LoGUNOV, SOVREMENNYI MEZHDUNARODNO-PRAVOVOI REZHIM DUNAIA (Moscow, 1958); Miehsler,
Die Donau im Volkerrecht, 2 DONAURAUM 176 (No. 3/4, 1957); Paunovic,
SLOBODA PLOVIDBE I UPRAVA PRIBREZNIK DRZAVA NO DUNAVU (Belgrade, 1957) ;
Smith, The Danube, 4 YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 191 (1950); Stolte, Moscow Regulates Traffic on the Danube, 7 INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF
U.S.S.R. BULL. 21 (1960) ; Toncic-Sorinj, Probleme der Internationalisierung
der Donau, 2 WISSENSCHAFTLICHER DIENST SUDOSTEUROPA 47 (1959); Wessely, Probleme des Donauverkehrs unter dem neuen Statut, 30 WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 28 (1950). Further articles on recent developments affecting the
Danube may also be found in issues of DONAURAUM, INTERNATIONALES
ARCHIV FUR VERKEHRSWESEN, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, REVUE
DE LA NAVIGATION INTERIEURE ET RHENANE, SCHIFFAHRT UND WELTVERKEHR,
STROM UND SEE, SUDOSTEUROPA-JAHRBUCH, TRANSPORT, VERKEHR, VOLKSWIRT and ZEITSCHRIFT FUR BINNENSCHIFFAHRT.

5 The Russians have had long experience in running some of the Soviet
Republics through similar devices. See U.S. Congress, House Special Comm.
on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning, Eighth Report Pt. 2, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 41 (1948).
On Soviet trade practices and the operation of joint companies which
were established by agreements between the Soviet Union and its satellites,
see DEWAR, SOVIET TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE 1945-1949 (London, 1951);
FEJTO, HISTOIRE DES DEMOCRATIES POPULAIRES 435ff (Paris, 1952) ; SPULBER,
THE ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE 166ff. (1957).

For the Soviet position, see Hungarian-Soviet Economic Review 20 (BUDApest, 1952); 4 New Central European Observer 182 (London, 1951).
On the liquidation, after Stalin's death, of the joint companies, see note
63, infra.
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waterway. The progression of events since the establishment of the
latest Danube Commission, in and outside of its successive sessions,
may conveniently be grouped under three clearly discernible phases
marked by Soviet-Yugoslav dissension, rapprochement and cooperation within the Commission, and externally by policies which have
substantially been affected by this internal setting.
DISSENSION

The Danube Commission has had a somewhat checkered existence, especially during the first years of its operation. It is the
irony of history that, just as the Soviet Union thought it had
secured, with the dutiful help of its satellites, exclusive control of
the Danube from below Linz to the Black Sea, it had to face up
to a new challenge, coming from a communist state - Tito's
Yugoslavia.
The Soviet-Yugoslav quarrel proved to be a disruptive influence which seriously interfered with Russia's hegemonistic plans
and cast its gloomy shadow on the forthcoming first session of the
Danube Commission (November 11-17, 1949)." While Moscow could
not entirely eliminate Belgrade from the Danube Commission
since Yugoslavia's geographic location placed her in a commanding
position over half of the Middle Danube and the important Iron
Gates sector, the Soviet Union regarded it as imperative that steps
be taken to prevent Yugoslavia from direct participation in the
management of the Commission. Thereby, Moscow hoped to tighten
its grip over the Danube.
From the very opening of the first session, continuous clashes
occurred between the representatives of the Cominform countries
and Yugoslavia. As a result, the latter found herself in a minority
of one, obstructed and frustrated at every turn and without any
influence on the Commission's decisions. The measures by which
the Soviet bloc achieved Tito's isolation may be traced to the three
vital issues which came up for discussion at the first session - the
election of officers, the rules of procedure, and the organization
of the Secretariat and Services of the Danube Commission.7
6 Manifestations of the communist split in matters of river navigation were
already apparent prior to the first session of the Danube Commission. In a
note dated October 15, 1949, Yugoslavia charged that, upon orders of the
Rumanian Government, the agencies of the Yugoslav State River Shipping
Company at Giurgiu and Braila, which had existed in Rumania continuously since 1925, were forced to close and their officials were expelled. The
permanent Yugoslav delegates to the Provisional Committee of the Iron
Gates Administration were so hampered in their work that they had to
move from Rumanian to Yugoslavian territory. As pointed out in the note,
the Rumanian methods against Yugoslavian citizens and officials, which
included such actions as unlawful seizure, arrest and search, had never
before been applied among the riparian states in navigation along the
Danube. See Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter F.P.R.Y.),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WHITE BOOK 341 (Belgrade, 1951).
7 The proceedings of the Danube Commission are published in Russian and
French, the two official and working languages of the Commission. For the
French version, see PROCES-VERBAUX DE LA COMMISSION DU DANUBE, published
from 1949 to 1953 in Galatz and since 1954 in Budapest. (Hereafter cited
as PROC2S-VERBAUX, the occasionally quoted English phrases are my trans-

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL.

XLI

Already, in regard to the first item, the delegates deliberately
ignored Yugoslavia and proceeded to elect, by voice vote,8 from a
single slate of candidates, a Rumanian President, a Czechoslovak
Vice-President and a Soviet Secretary for a three-year period. The
differences of opinion which, in the election of officers, were
characterized by a measure of Yugoslav self-restraint, 9 mushroomed
into substantial proportions in the course of ensuing debates over
procedural rules and administrative organization.
An analysis of the formalistic arguments reveals that underlying the legal facade was the relentless struggle for exclusive
Soviet control in the organization. The question was whether a
communist country that dared to challenge Stalin's authority could
have a role in the management of the Commission. For a time this
question was answered in the negative, and as a result, the Soviet
bloc rejected the Yugoslav proposals for the rotation of all services
and directing posts of the Commission and the recruitment of
personnel on the basis of equality.1 0 Instead, the Soviet-proposed l '
and adopted Rules of Procedure 12 and Statute relating to the
organization of the Secretariat and Services of the Danube Commission vested complete administrative control in the Secretary
who was given full power to recruit his staff on the basis of "merit"
without regard to geographical distribution. 13 The virtually unlimited powers of the Secretary were assured by the fact that,
since he was a delegate, he was accountable only to his government
and not to the Commission. 14 Furthermore, since none of the delelations.) The full and true nature of the proceedings put out during the
Cominform-Yugoslav dispute has been subject to question. According to a
Yugoslav source, the minutes were disorderly and failed to record opposing

views. See 4

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

13 (July 1, 1953).

8 The Yugoslav proposal for a secret ballot was rejected by a vote of 5 to 1.
I PROCES-VERBAUX 157, 164, 230.

9 Yugoslavia cast its vote against the election of the Rumanian President,
but abstained from voting in connection with the elections of the VicePresident and the Secretary. Id. at 157ff.
10 The Yugoslav draft of the rules of procedure was rejected as a basis for
discussion by a vote of 5 to 1. The negative vote of Yugoslavia came to be
a recurrent pattern during the Tito-Cominform rift. For a discussion and
text of the Yugoslav draft, see id. at 164, 189, 230.
11 For texts of the Soviet draft of the rules of procedure and rejected Yugoslav amendments, see id. at 225, 244.
12 Under the Rules of Procedure, the President and the Vice-President exercised only certain symbolic functions. Rule 12, for instance, provided that
correspondence with governments and international organizations was to
be signed by the President or Vice-President and the Secretary, whereas
correspondence with other authorities and institutions was to be signed
by the Secretary or a person authorized by him. A Yugoslav proposal, by
which the President would have directed the work of the Commission with
the aid of the Secretary, was rejected. For a discussion and text of the
Rules of Procedure, see id. at 214, 230.
13 See Rules 2, 4 and 5 of the Statute. For texts of the Statute, the Soviet
draft statute and a Yugoslav amendment which unsuccessfully proposed
the creation of a drafting committee composed of representatives of each
of the six member states, see I PROCES-VERBAUX 172, 219, 239, 248.
14 If the Secretary was temporarily unable to exercise his functions, he was
to be replaced by his deputy, that is, another member of his delegation; but
if the President and Vice-President were unable to exercise their functions,
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gates besides the Secretary could be present at headquarters while
the Commission was not in session, the road was cleared for the
Soviet Secretary to become the single-handed master of the organization.
In the face of Moscow's hegemonistic practices, the Yugoslav
representative rightly observed that the administrative organization
of the Commission was contrary to the procedure generally adopted
by international organizations and international law, under which
members of international bodies were entitled to permanent control
over the work of the body. 15 It was also contrary to the Danube
Convention since it transferred fundamental rights of the Commission, through the office of the virtually omnipotent Secretarydelegate, to one single member-state.16 Stalin's Russia, naturally,
saw no foundation in the Yugoslav charges and the satellites echoed
Moscow's view that the rules adopted by the Soviet majority corresponded to genuinely democratic principles."
Despite the rebuffs she had received, Yugoslavia attended the
second session of the Commission (March 23-27, 1950) if for no
other reason than to protest the fact that important documents,
such as the plan of work and budget, had been made available to
the Yugoslav delegation barely before the commencement of the
meeting and that all her requests for information from the Commission had gone unanswered. 8 Russia, in turn, obliquely rebuked
Yugoslavia's efforts to loosen Soviet control and set the keynote
for the Commission's work by accusing the West of attempted
interference and by reiterating her slogans that the Danube- belonged to the Danubian countries and that it would never flow
toward the West.' 9 On this warning, the Commission then proceeded to pass the Soviet-supported
proposals with the usual
20
disregard for Yugoslavia's views.
By the time the third session (December 10-15, 1950) opened,
the Secretary, not alternates in their delegations, had to take over. See
Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure.
15 While the rejected Yugoslav draft allowed each member to demand information regarding the work of the Commissim at any time, the adopted
Rules of Procedure had no such provision. Similarly, the latter made no
provision for standing subcommittees with equal representation, but only
for ad hoc working groups to be appointed by the Commission or, in case
of urgency, by the President and the Secretary "from among its members."
See Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure and the discussion of it, I PROCESVERBAUX 163, 183, 215, 231.
16 Id. at 189-191.
17 Id. at 195ff.
18 I1 id. at 131, 168, 199.
19 Id. at 118.
20 Among the items discussed were the budget and the importance of improve-

ment of navigation in the Gabcikovo-Gonyu sector. In regard to the latter,
the Commission charged its Services to determine the extent of hydrotechnical works which were necessary. The Commission also decided to call
upon the Secretary to determine the fate of the property of the International
Danube Commission and authorized him to take possession of such property
and reclaim it, if necessary. A Yugoslav proposal for an equal distribution
of jobs in the organization's apparatus among the members, taking into
consideration the importance of the job, was defeated. See id. at 131, 147,
184, 189, 190.
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Yugoslavia made no bones about its sweeping condemnation of
Soviet actions. In the bluntest and most direct language ever used
in the Commission, the Yugoslav delegate charged that the Rules
of Procedure and Statute adopted by the Soviet-led majority were
contrary to Vishinsky's statement at Belgrade and violated the
Danube Convention which assured free navigation with due regard to the sovereign rights of the Danubian states. "When we
pass from words to deeds," he went on, "we could observe that
words of the Soviet representative state one thing and in reality
they result in something else." He repeated one of his earlier
charges that the Commission's essential competence had been conferred upon the Secretary, a Soviet delegate, who was not subject
to the control of the Commission; at the same time, the participation and influence of the other delegates were reduced to a minimum. He added that Yugoslavia did not even succeed in realizing
that minimum. In lieu of the formal work of the Commission,
Yugoslavia demanded assurances for a "real, equal and permanent
participation by all delegates. '21 Not only were there no assurances
forthcoming, but the Soviet delegate added oil to the fire by accusing Yugoslavia of interfering with free navigation, placing unwarranted controls over 2 foreign
ships and forbidding them the use of
2
some Yugoslav ports.

The negative attitude of the Soviet-dominated Commission
toward Yugoslavia's demand for equal participation in its control,
as well as the establishment over Yugoslav objection of a special
fluvial administration along the Rajka-Gonyu sector 23 and the fact
2
that Yugoslavia was excluded from all sixteen major posts,
clearly showed that Russia was doing her best to turn the Danube,
the biggest European international waterway, into a Russian river.
Yugoslavia, on her part, conscious of her own importance as a
riparian, as well as of likely Western support in case of an armed
conflict with Russia, stood up for her rights, even though at the
conference table she seemed to be fighting - during that time
at any rate - a losing battle against the Soviet bloc.
It was at the fourth session (May 23-June 5, 1951) that the
Moscow-Belgrade rift in the Commission reached its climax. For
quite some time relations between the two countries had been
.steadily deteriorating. 25 Diplomatic relations between the Comin21

111

22Id.

id. at 219, 235.
at 224.

23 Yugoslavia objected to the establishment, in violation of the express pro-

visions of the Convention and without prior discussion, of a special river
administration over the Rajka-Gonyu sector along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border, which was twice as large as the Gapcikovo-Gonyu sector
for which administration was provided in the Convention. Yugoslavia
charged that, by setting up this administration, the Commission was exceeding its authority and competence. Id. at 247-248, 253.
24 Yugoslavia was not only excluded from the posts of President, Vice-President and Secretary, but also from 13 other directing posts in the Secretariat
and Services of the Commission. She was only offered the minor posts of
25

an assistant controller, an engineer, a lawyer and a statistician. Id. at 221222; VII id. at 290, 303, 344ff.
Perhaps the most intimidating acts were the military maneuvers held by the
Soviets in the spring of 1950 in the Austrian sector of the waterway. YugoQlavia stronalv objected to these war exercises since they made navigation
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form countries and Yugoslavia had been broken. Harrassments of
Yugoslav officials and citizens in Soviet bloc countries were notably
increasing. For a while it appeared that the only thing which prevented a complete embargo on Yugoslav shipping by the Cominform nations was the fear of Yugoslavia's retaliation, which could
have resulted in the latter's closing up of essential fluvial traffic
between the Middle and the Lower Danube.
It was in this climate of continuously worsening Soviet-Yugoslav relations that the Danube Commission gathered for its ominous
fourth session. While the Soviet Union had paid lip service to the
principles of the Belgrade Convention many times beforehand, at
this session it became increasingly evident that she was now openly
trying to revise it to suit her own imperialistic designs. The key
agenda item used for this purpose was a seemingly innocuous
Soviet-inspired
draft of basic rules governing navigation on the
26
Danube.
The main provisions of the proposal, which were eventually
adopted by the Commission, related to the rafting of timber, the
granting of absolute priority of passage to vessels navigating the
Danube, and the right of states to investigate the causes of damage,
collision and 2 other
losses caused by foreign vessels in their terri7
torial waters.
In regard to the first, the draft prohibited the free rafting of
timber presumably on the grounds that it was obsolete and dangerous to shipping. Actually, rafts were floated along the banks of the
Danube and constituted little barrier to navigation. Thus it was
more likely that the provision was motivated by Russia's desire to
curtail Yugoslavia's transportation of timber by raft on the river
and to capture the lucrative transport of wood for her own ships
and the ships of the28 joint shipping companies that she controlled in
the satellite states.
The second major provision of the draft proposed to grant
absolute priority of passage to vessels navigating either upstream
or downstream on the Danube over boats entering the main channel
from its tributaries. Yugoslavia strongly opposed such priority of
international over internal traffic since it was to be given irrespecvirtually impossible and as such were in violation of Articles 1 and 2 of
the Belgrade Convention which guaranteed free and open navigation on
the Danube. Yugoslavia also noted that, although Article 26 of the Convention provided for non-discrimination in customs, health and police procedures, the Russian military authorities were unduly delaying Yugoslav
vessels passing through the Soviet sector of the Danube in Austria. The
Russian reply to these allegations simply stated that the Soviet commandants
had every right to proceed as they did since they acted in their capacity
ns occupation authorities. For texts of Yugoslavia's protest notes of June
8 and June 13, 1950, and the Soviet reply of August 22, 1950, as well as
subsequent exchanges, see F.P.R.Y., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 336, 337, 358.
20 The basic regulations were discussed by a working group prior to the fourth
session of the Commission. For texts of the working group's report and the
draft of basic regulations governing navigation on the Danube, see IV
PROCES-VERBAUX 291, 346.
27 For a text of the adopted Basic Regulations Governing Navigation on the
Danube, see id. at 305.'
28 Id. at 308.
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tive of whether it was necessary or not, whether the vessel was
moving upstream or downstream, that is, whether the boat was
in an easier or a harder situation than the vessel coming from a
tributary. Yugoslavia felt that the provision was directed primarily
tributaries on her territory
against her since there were several
29
constantly used by her vessels.
The provision which precipitated the Yugoslav walk-out purported to deprive the riparian states of the right to investigate the
causes of damage, collision, and other losses occasioned by foreign
vessels in their territorial waters. Yugoslav opposition to this proposal stemmed not so much from such theoretical considerations
that the provision was contrary to the well-established principle of
locus regit actum and violated the sovereign rights of the riparian
states, but mainly from the realization of the fact that, by virtue
of the stipulation, ships could freely anchor in the territorial waters
of a riparian for the purposes of sabotage, infiltration, and similar
activities without any fear of inspection. The provision, if accepted
by Belgrade, would in fact have empowered the Soviet authorities
to conduct investigations in Yugoslavia. At the same time, no state
would have had an occasion to conduct an inquiry on Soviet territory since Russia holds only a relatively small channel on the left
bank of the Danube of which at that time -she had the exclusive
use.30
The provision concerning the investigation of damage showed
most clearly that the draft regulations were intended to give increased navigation rights to Russia, while imposing maximum liabilities on the other riparian states. Belgrade's reaction to the
draft proposals, according to a Yugoslav source, was the same as
Serbia's had been in 1914 when she risked war rather than allow
foreign investigators on her territory. 8 1 Yugoslavia charged that,
by the mechanical voting on the rules of navigation and the automatic rejection of her "justified" amendments, she was systematically placed before an accomplished fact. The other riparians'
"brutal" discrimination against her, and the imposition of obligations contradicting the letter and spirit of the Convention of 1948,
constituted an "open revision" of the same and rendered her partici•pation in the Commission's work impossible.8 2 Thus, on June 2,
1951, the Yugoslav delegation walked out of the meeting after
fruitless attempts to prevent the adoption of new rules of navigation that purported to give the Soviet Union complete control of the
river from Linz to the Black Sea.

3

Subsequently, Yugoslavia in-

formed the Commission that it would thereafter establish its own
and considered the Soviet-imrules of navigation on the Danube
34
posed rules to be null and void.
29

Id. at 308ff.

30 Id. at 361ff.
31 3 RVVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 10

(1952).

32 IV PROCES-VERBAUX 218, 262.
3 The new regulations were to serve as a guide for the drafting of national

laws governing navigation on the Danube. Id. at 262, 304.
34 The Yugoslav note of August 23, 1951, contended that the Basic Regula-

tions were contrary to the Danube Convention of 1948 insofar as they gave
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Insofar as Yugoslavia was concerned, the fourth session of the
Danube Commission demonstrated that the Soviet Union had no
desire to regulate the question of navigation on the Danube, but
only intended to apply measures to further its policy of domination. Moscow, in turn, reacted with the usual technique of counteraccusation, charging that the Yugoslav walk-out had been decided
prior to the commencement of the session under the dictates of
American imperialistic circles who had hoped to interfere with the
normal work of the Commission.35 Actually, while the Western
Powers undoubtedly favored liberalization within the Danube Commission, there is no evidence to indicate that the Yugoslav walkout was carried out after prior consultation with Washington or
that it was prompted by American pressure on Yugoslavia.
It was not to the benefit of the Soviet Union, however, to have
Yugoslavia permanently withdraw from the Commission. Her
geographical position was much too strategic for this and further
antagonism might have led to a complete disruption of the already
substantially reduced river traffic and might have driven her into
closer ties with the West. Last, but not least, the existing international situation in the wake of the Korean conflict also seemed to
require a policy of self-restraint, so long as such policy did not
jeopardize Soviet authority within the Danube Commission. Accordingly, the Kremlin regarded it as necessary to secure at least
a formal modus vivendi with Tito. To this Yugoslavia had no objection since her complete withdrawal from the Commission would
have been of little, if any, benefit. Moreover, Yugoslavia had supported the Convention of 1948 and objected solely to the Soviet
usurpation of authority in violation of the principle of equality.
Thus, at the fifth session (December 10-19, 1951), Yugoslavia was
in attendance.
The somewhat conciliatory attitude of the Soviet bloc was not
only reflected in the general tone of the discussions but in the absence of the usual political debates. The matter of procedure for
investigating accidents on the Danube was again brought up at this
session. 6 The Soviet Union, in an attempt to avoid another Yugoslav walk-out, had suggested a modification of the Unified Regulations adopted at the previous session, so that riparian states could
conduct investigations at least in those cases where they suffered
damages through the accident. While the new Soviet proposal met
some of the Yugoslav objections, 37 it was still unacceptable to Yuthe Soviet Union control over the river in violation of the sovereign rights
of the riparian countries. 5 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
26 (1951).
35 Carantino, Autour de la 5me Session de la Conference Danubienne, 54 REVUE
POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 169, 174 (1952).

36 It came up in connection with the discussion of the draft regulations on

river supervision prepared by the Soviet-controlled Secretariat. For texts
of the draft and proposed amendments, see V PROCES-VERBAUX 369.
37 Yugoslavia, for instance, objected to a proposal which would have limited
the riparian country's right to investigate accidents to such cases where
"material damage" occurred, pointing out that damage could arise as a
result of criminal action without simultaneous material losses being suffered by the country in question. The eventually adopted regulations (Arts.
17 and 18) made no reference to "material damage" but simply to "damage."
Id. at 279ff., 357ff.
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goslavia because of its failure to make it clear that the criterion of
damage, that is whether damage had been caused or not, was to
be determined by the laws of the state where the damage occurred. 8 Yugoslavia feared that without such clarification the question of damage was likely to be decided by the Soviet majority in
the Danube Commission. Finally, Moscow's formula was put
through over opposition by the Yugoslav delegate who reserved his
country's right to recognize the Commission's decisions pertaining
to the policing of the river only insofar
as they were in accordance
89
with Yugoslavia's domestic- laws.

In regard to another basic question, the budget, the Yugoslav
representative rebuked the satellites for not taking a stand of their
own, even in such an important matter as the finances of the Commission. Yugoslavia opposed the budget not only because it was
decided by a simple vote, but more importantly because, in Belgrade's view, the working methods in the Commission were not reflective of the type of relations which should have prevailed among
equal countries. In addition, Yugoslavia was not overly desirous
of
40
lending its financial support to projects directed by Russia.
While Yugoslav policy seemed to have reaped no immediate
tangible benefits at the fifth session of the Commission, it was felt
that the Kremlin would eventually have to come to grips with the
hard facts of geography, economics, and power politics. The lessening of the sharpness of the over-all tone of the discussions and the
modifications, though admittedly minor, of the formerly intransigent Soviet position, must have given some gratification to Yugoslav policy-makers. In addition, there were other slightly encouraging straws in the wind. During the period immediately following
the fifth session, certain events took place which once more clearly
indicated the great economic significance of the Danube as a carrier of trade. The Russians, who were seriously handicapped by a
shortage of suitable vessels in the Austrian sector under their control, began to issue .permits allowing Austrian ships 'to sail down
41
into the Soviet zone of Austria and up to the Hungarian border.
It was in this climate of somewhat lessening tensions that Yugoslavia decided to submit to the sixth session (June 23-July 2, 1952)
a draft for the revision of the Rules of Procedure and the Statute
relating to the organization of the Secretariat and Services of the
Commission, with a view toward making it more representative. 42
In the past, such a proposal would have been rejected outright by
the Commission, but now the Soviet-controlled majority referred it
for study to a Special Committee. 43 It soon became obvious, howA Yugoslav amendment embodying such clarification was defeated by the
usual 5 to 1 vote. Id. at 279, 372.
39 The Regulations on River Supervision on the Danube were adopted by a
vote of 5 to 1. Id. at 282, 356-357.
40 Id. at 273, 276.
41 New York Times, June 15, 1952, p. 5, col. 2. Certain economic restrictions
governing the Danube, however, continued to remain in effect. See Gazette
of the Allied Commission for Austria 10, 19 (April 1953).
3

42VI PROCES-VERBAUX 389ff., 407.

43

Id. at 382.
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ever, that this was more of a delaying tactic than a decision prompted by the complexity of the subject matter. Thus, when Yugoslavia
wished to have its proposal included in the agenda of the seventh
session (December 15-26, 1952), it met with resolute opposition from
the Soviet bloc. 44 As this session wore on, it became increasingly ap-

parent that Soviet-Yugoslav relations were once again characterized
by the negative aspects which had manifested themselves in earlier
sessions. Serious disagreements were evident in relation to the
Secretariat's report on the Commission's work, 43 the budget 46 and
the election of officers. 47 The disagreements reached their peak in
Rumania's charges against the alleged unilateral acts of Yugoslav
authorities at the Iron Gates sector 48 and in Yugoslav counter44 In the face of this opposition, the Yugoslav delegate

bitterly remarked
that the Danube Commission during its short-lived existence had not been
an organization of all Danubian countries, but one which served the purposes of a single member of the Commission. He felt that the majority
preferred to postpone discussion of the Yugoslav draft for an indefinite
period since it was difficult openly to oppose the democratic principles and,
especially, the principle of peaceful collaboration among the Danubian
countries, upon which the proposal was based. VII id. at 276, 278.
45 In connection with the Secretariat's report on the Commission's accomplishments, the Yugoslav representative pointed out that the Secretariat had
no right to cc-nment on or defend the rules of procedure as it did in the
report since it knew that not all the members of the Commission agreed
with the statement that the Rules of Procedure had "by and large proved
themselves just." Id. at 288, 465.
46 In 1950 Yugoslavia paid only an advance sum of 176,700 rubles out of its
allotted budgetary share of 540,000 rubles. With the additional assessments
of 100,000 and 150,000 rubles for 1951 and 1952 respectively, which Yugoslavia refused to pay, the total Yugoslav debt at the time of the seventh
session (end of 1952) amounted to 613,300 rubles. Yugoslavia regarded
these financial obligations as too excessive and, as in the course of the
fifth session, she sought again to justify her nonpayment on the ground
that her rights and obligations were inseparable. She was willing to settle
the matter of finances as soon as the other members of the Commission
changed their attitude toward her justified demand for equal participation
in the management of the Commission. The position of the Soviet bloc
toward Yugoslavia's nonpayment was summed up by the Hungarian delegate
who stated that the Yugoslav representative was haunted by the phantom
of discrimination against his country. Subsequently the Commission found
Belgrade's explanation unsatisfactory and declared that the nonpayment
of her dues constituted a violation of the Convention of 1948. Id. at 290,
293, 327, 329, 482, 498.
47 Yugoslavia accused the Soviet bloc of open discrimination against her since
she was offered only four minor posts. The accusation, however, did not
prevent the Commission from once more ignoring Yugoslavia and electing
a Soviet Secretary, a Rumanian President and a Hungarian Vice-President.
Id. at 290, 303, 344ff.
48 The Commission considered a controversial motion by Rumania to censure
Yugoslavia for the "unilateral" measures it took in the Iron Gates sector.
On October 5, 1945, Rumania and Yugoslavia had set up a Provisional Committee for the joint administration of the Iron Gates sector of the river
which forms a boundary between the two countries. The Committee had
agreed to pay Yugoslavia 70,000 Swiss francs a year in return for the use
of locomotive traction installations much the same way as when the old
International Commission was in charge. In October, 1952, however, Yugoslavia took over the traction facilities as a retaliation against Rumania's
failure to pay the agreed annual rent and declared that when a party to
a contract failed to meet its obligations, it relinquished its right to demand
fulfillment of the contract from the other party. Despite these Yugoslav
representations, the Commission condemned the "unilateral" and "illegal"
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charges of alleged Rumanian obstruction of navigation on the
Danube.49 At one point the Yugoslav representative sharply remarked that he knew of no international organization - apart from
the Danube Commission - where the interests
and rights of the
members had been so "brutally" violated. 50
RAPPROCHEMENT

The first sign of a notable change in the relation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc came shortly after Stalin's death with the
announcement that, on May 30, 1953, an agreement had been signed
between Yugoslavia and Rumania on the joint control and administration of the Iron Gates sector. 51 While the agreement related
primarily to technical problems, it was characteristically looked
upon as a sign of Russian good will. Actually, the agreement was
of mutual benefit inasmuch as it put an end to a dispute that was
more of a nuisance than a political asset.
Following the signature of the Yugoslav-Rumanian agreement,
expectations were high in the West that the Special Committee,
which was still considering the Yugoslav draft for procedural and
organizational reforms, would also reflect a more conciliatory attitude. The expectation was heightened by the fact that, less than a
month before the Special Committee was scheduled to meet, Austria
and Hungary had reached an agreement providing for the resumption and regulation of Danubian traffic between the two countries. 52
The signing of the Yugoslav-Rumanian and Austro-Hungarian
agreements were steps in the direction of normalizing navigation on
the Danube and reducing the tension that existed between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc. The Yugoslav permission in June 1953,
allowing the U.S.S.R. to move its warships from Vienna to the Black
Sea - the first such move since Belgrade's quarrel with Moscow was a concrete manifestation of this trend. 55
In the substantially improved atmosphere of the eighth session
(June 26-July 3, 1953), the Yugoslav proposals were finally brought
out of the Special Committee. Whereas the basic demand to remove
control from the hands of the Soviet Secretary was not met, significant changes were introduced on the recommendation of the committee. 54 The very same states which had previously denounced the
actions of Yugoslav authorities and demanded that Belgrade refrain from

interfering with normal navigation 'on the river and respect the provisions
of the Danube Convention. Id. at 356, 367, 388, 416, 503; F.P.R.Y., Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., supra, note 6 at 341.
49 The Commission took no action on the Yugoslav charge that Rumania was
obstructing navigation on the Danube. VII PROCES-VERBAUX 423.
50 Id. at 303.
51 Under the agreement, a permanent administrative body, composed equally
of Yugoslavs and Rumanians, was set up for the narrow gorge between
the two countries through which the Danube shipping must be towed by
land locomotive or barge. The administration has its own budget and establishes its own rules of procedure. New York Times, May 15, 1953, p. 1,
col. 1; June 1, 1953, p. 5, col. 5.
52 The Austro-Hungarian agreement was signed in Budapest on May 15, 1953.
KEESING, CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 13086 (August 15-22, 1953).
53 Ibid.
54 The Special Committee met in Bucharest from June 8-24, 1953. For a text

of the Special Committee's recommendations, see VIII

PROCES-VERBAUX

365.
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Yugoslav proposal, now suddenly were full of praise for the Sovietsupported changes which reproduced many ideas advanced in the
Yugoslav draft. 55 Despite the substantial concessions, Yugoslavia
voted against the new rules since she felt that without a rotation
of posts the Secretary would continue to maintain his dominant
position and hence there would be no genuine equality in the Commission.5 6
While the changes introduced in the administrative structure
of the Danube Commission did not fully meet with Yugoslav approval, nonetheless they must be regarded as a significant move
toward the improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations which were
soon thereafter normalized by the re-establishment of diplomatic
representation between the two countries. As a further conciliatory
gesture, the Commission also decided to charge its President and
Secretary with the preparation of a draft statute relating to the
organization of the Secretariat and the Services of the Commission,
7
taking into consideration comments from all member states.5
Although the eighth session of the Danube Commision revealed
a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Soviet Union toward
Yugoslavia, it was hardly indicative of the major changes that
were to take place at the ninth session (December 9-17, 1953). Here,
for the first time since the creation of the Commission, all decisions
were made unanimously and on the basis of recognizing Yugoslavia's right to equal participation in the administrative management of Danubian navigation. Interestingly enough, the Soviet
representative was the one who proposed to modify Article 7 of the
Rules of Procedure, which had been adopted only at the previous
session, to the effect that in filling the three major posts (Secretary, President, Vice-President) the Commission should give due
regard to the principle of rotation and should choose from among
representatives of states which during the preceding three years
had not held any eligible posts. He added that he was motivated by
the desire for all countries to participate actively in the work of the
Commission.58 The Soviet proposal constituted a major concession
55 For a text of the Yugoslav draft, see VI id. at 389. A brief appraisal of

the draft may be found in 4 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 13 (1953).
259, 267, 271.
The revised rules provided for the election of the Commission's President, Vice-President and Secretary by secret ballot and simple majority vote
and stipulated that, in proposing candidates for these three posts, the
Commission be led by the consideration that a representative of each state
have the opportunity to occupy one of these posts at least once during
"three periods of three years" (Rules 6 and 7). Under the new rules, the
Secretary, jointly with the President, was empowered to exercise general
direction over the affairs of the Commission, oversee and regulate the work
of the Secretariat and the Services and sign the proceedings in the name
of the Commission (Rules 8 and 10). The Secretariat and the Services were
to be headed by a Director who was personally responsible for his work
to the Commission (Rule 38). All personnel of the Commission were to be
recruited, insofar as possible on the basis of equality considering the
number and importance of the positions, from among the citizens of the
member states which the latter placed at the disposal of the Commission
(Rule 40). Id. at 377ff., 381ff.
57 Id. at 364.
58 IX id. at 205, 207, 257.

56 VIII PROCES-VERBAUX
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to Yugoslavia which had long championed the idea of full equality.
Following the unanimous acceptance of the Russian proposal, new
elections were held and, as a result, for the first time Yugoslavia
received the important post of Secretary. 59 The Commission's subsequent adoption of new rules relating to the organization of the
Secretariat and -Services of the Commission" as well as the approval of another- long-standing Yugoslav proposal to move the
headquarters of the organization from Galatz to Budapest were
appropriate follow-ups to Moscow's policy of conciliation.6 1 The
liberalization of the internal working methods and rules of the
Danube Commission was not only of benefit to Yugoslavia but to
the satellite states as well, not so much in the sense of permitting
them any independent course of action but in the greater flexibility
that they seem to have acquired in advancing their own proposals.
The reasons for the radical and complete reversal of Moscow's
attitude toward Belgrade must be sought in both external and domestic factors influencing Soviet policy. First, the ninth session took
place at a time when the impact of the Graeco-Turkish-Yugoslav
alignment seems to have been increasingly felt, especially due to
the uneasiness of the Soviet position which continued for some time
after Stalin's death. Second, the Soviet Union had more and more
come to realize the great economic significance of the Danube which
could be utilized fully only by a policy of accommodation with
Yugoslavia in view of the latter's key position. Third, the change in
Moscow's policy could also have been prompted by a desire to enhance the reputation of the Danube Commission as an international
organization, a reputation which reached its lowest ebb during the
era of Stalinist arbitrariness.
The Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation which took place in the
course of the ninth session seemed to be part of a broader policy of
relaxation of Soviet intransigence as indicated by a series of bilateral agreements between the riparian states, 62 a number of Soviet
59 At the same time, a Hungarian President and a Bulgarian Vice-President
were also elected. Id. at 211.
60 Under the new rules relating to the organization of the Secretariat and
Services of the Danube Commission, the number of administrative sections
in these organs was reduced from eleven to six. The Director, the two
assistant-directors and the chiefs of sections of the Secretariat and Services
were to be appointed by the Commission. Vacant posts were to be filled by
the President and Secretary of the Commission in consultation with the
Director, bearing in mind the requirement, already incorporated in Rule
40 of the Rules of Procedure by the eighth session, to effect a fair distribution of appointments among all member countries from the viewpoint of
number and importance of the posts. Id. at 193, 252.
61 While earlier Yugoslav proposals had been voted down, at the ninth session,
upon motion of the Hungarian representative, the Commission unanimously
decided to move the headquarters from Galatz to the more centrally located
Budapest. Id. at 199, 204, 256.
62Apart from the Austro-Hungarian agreement already mentioned, other
agreements were concluded with Austria by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria and Rumania in 1953, 1954 and 1955. They were essentially similar, providing for the reciprocal use of the river and harbor facilities and
the mutual establishment of shipping and import agencies in the territories
of the contracting parties. Austria also concluded a Treaty of Trade and
Navigation on October 17, 1955, with the U.S.S.R. and the whole series was
culminated on June 14, 1957, when agreement was reached between the
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concessions to the satellites63 and the signing of the Austrian State
Treaty 64 which considerably improved Austria's shipping prospects.
COOPERATION

The Commission's sessions following the spectacular reversal
of Soviet policy toward Belgrade reflected a spirit of compromise
and a desire for cooperation between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia.65 The recognized need for stabilization of the internal organization of the Commission's apparatus made it necessary that
appropriate conditions for normalization be created. In line with
this policy, the Soviet bloc decided to annul Yugoslavia's debt of
613,300 rubles which the latter owed to the Commission for the
years 1950, 1951 and 1952 on its budgetary assessments. 6 In addition, the complete change in the Commission's attitude was also apparent from the fact that the proceedings were swift, unanimous
Soviet Union and Austria concerning the settlement of technical and commercial questions relating to navigation on the Danube. The latter agreement provided for most-favored-nation treatment in all matters relating
to merchant shipping on the Danube. West Germany also entered into
agreements with the communist states (e.g., with Russia on April 25, 1958),
however, in her case, they were mostly concluded as part of general trade
agreements. See 240 U.N.T.S. 289 (1956) ; 285 id. 169 (1958) ; 362 id. 119
(1959) ; 346 id. 71 (1959) ; The Times (London), November 12, 1954, p. 6;
May 16, 1955, p. 6; July 4, 1955, p. 8.
Various bilateral accords were also signed between the satellite states
themselves. The most important was the Agreement of December 5, 1953, between the Soviet Union and Rumania which, in conformity with Article 20 of
the Danube Convention, provided for the establishment of a Special Fluvial
Administration to effectuate hydro-technical works and regulate navigation on the Lower Danube from the mouth of the Sulina Channel to Braila.
The Administration began to function in July 1954 and was, by the subsequent Agreement of July 18, 1957, turned over by Russia to Rumania.
See XI PROCES-VERBAUX 175; XIII id. at 331; LOGUNOV, SOVREMENNYI
MEZHDUNARODNO-PRAVOVOI REZHIM DUNAIA 104 (Moscow 1958). For another
agreement on Danubian navigation, concluded between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on April 19, 1957, see 349 U.N.T.S. 3 (1960).
63 For example, the ships of both West Germany and France were given permission to travel over the Soviet-occupied section of the Danube prior to the
conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty. Other concessions included the
liquidation of the joint navigation companies through a series of agreements between the satellite states and the Soviet Union which turned over
its shares to the national shipping companies. See, for instance, the Agreement between the Soviet Union and Hungary concerning the transfer and
sale to Hungary of Soviet shares in Hungarian-Soviet joint-stock companies, signed on November 6, 1954, in Moscow. VNESHNIAIA TORGOVLIA 43
(No. 12, 1954) ; New York Times, April 29, 1955, p. 1.
61 Article 31 of the Austrian State Treaty made navigation on the Danube
free and open to all nations.
65 At the tenth (June 8-15, 1954), eleventh (December 8-15, 1954) and twelfth
(June 8-13, 1955) sessions, the Hungarian President praised the full and
good collaboration among all members of the Commission and referred to
the improved international climate which created an atmosphere favorable
to the improvement of navigation conditions. Despite the announced cooperation, it was reported that in 1956 another permanent Danube Commission was set up by the Soviet-controlled Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance to draft measures for the increased utilization of the Danube
for power, irrigation and navigation. Belgrade viewed this Commission
as a rival to the official Danube Commission. X PROCES-VERBAUX 223; XI
id. at 166; XII id. at 119; New York Times, September 2, 1956, p. 26.
66 VII PROCES-VERBAUX 482; XII id. at 150.
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agreements were reached with little discussion, 67 political debates
were lacking and differences of opinion were ironed out in working
groups.68 Although the Commission's budget continued to be of a
modest 1.2 million rubles (about $300,000) per year, 69 much greater
attention was paid to70 technical matters with a view to improving
Danubian navigation.
By the time the thirteenth session (December 7-15, 1955)
opened, the Danube Commission's general attitude toward the West
also underwent certain significant changes. In lieu of the usual vituperative attacks on Western imperialism, the Commission's President referred to the greatly improved international climate following the Geneva Conference which, in his view, showed that war was
not inevitable and that it was possible to resolve all international
problems by way of negotiations and reciprocal concessions. 71 Instead of depicting the Danube as a river flowing toward the East,
he spoke of it as a waterway that unites East and West. He emphasized that, in the realization of its fundamental task of improving navigation on the Danube, the Commission was rendering a
precious service to the cause of peace. At the same session, the
Soviet representative, in a similarly conciliatory tone, called for
increased contacts and systematic exchange of information and
documentation between the Commission and other organizations
concerned with international water transport.7 2 His words were
soon followed by deeds and, early in 1956, representatives of the
Danube Commission met with other experts in Geneva under the
auspices of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe
to work out a draft convention regarding a standard contract for
For instance, the tenth session unanimously approved the new rules for the
functioning of the various sections of the Secretariat and Services of the
Commission, whereas the eleventh session adopted rules relating to the
rights and obligations of the functionaries of these organs. X id. at 219,
315ff.; XI id. at 193, 256ff.
68 While the Commission's time was not taken up with internal political debates, the Hungarian representative took time out to state that the European and International Commissions had never served the interests of the
riparian states but had used the Danube as an instrument of oppression
and exploitation of the Danubian peoples. Id. at 165.
61The budgets for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956 were set at 1,194,000,
1,233,000 and 1,226,600 rubles respectively. In 1957 it was set at 3,852,000
forints and in 1961 at 4,703,614 forints (about $400,000), indicating increase
over previous figures. XI id. at 209; XII id. at 164; XIV id. at 249; XV
id. at 287; XX id. at 481.
711Among the technical matters discussed must be mentioned the establishment
of a uniform system of marking navigable routes on the Danube, progress
of hydro-technical works, preparation of nautical maps, geophysical descriptions of the Danube and its nautical conditions, establishment of uniform
rules of veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance, coordination of hydrometeorological services and observations, and collection of data concerning
cargo movements through the Sulina Channel. The Commission also began
consideration of the preparation of an integrated, long-term development
project - a "Grand Plan" - for the improvement of Danubian navigation.
X id. at 205ff., 238ff.; XI id. at 165, 171ff; XII id. at 132, 193; XIV id. at
235ff. Cf. note 88 infra.
71XIII PROCES-VERBAUX 197.
72 XIII id. at 209.
73 During the same year, Commission representatives also participated in a
conference at Basel under the auspices of the Association Internationale
67
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the international transportation of goods on inland waterways.7 8
Shortly thereafter, at the fourteenth session (June 7-13, 1956), for
the first time an observer from the Economic Commission for
Europe was present. 4 It was at this meeting that the Yugoslav
delegate, with Moscow's full approval, went out of his way to
stress the importance of the establishment of collaboration and
contacts between the Commission and competent organs of the
United Nations.7 5 This, indeed, seemed to be a major departure
from the earlier Soviet line which, at the height of the Tito-Cominform quarrel, resolutely opposed
contacts between the Commis76
sion and the United Nations.
The change in Moscow's policy was not limited to the establishment of contacts with the West, but it also encompassed the
very membership structure of the Commission. Soviet Russia no
longer intended to defer Austria's admission. On the contrary,
Moscow even held out the prospect of early West German participation. Thus, at the fifteenth session (June 5-14, 1957), some
months after the abortive Hungarian Revolution, the Hungarian
President of the Commission, in the presence of Austrian and West
German observers, echoed the Soviet view by declaring that the
time was near when both countries
would occupy their seats as
77
full members of the Commission.
A glimpse at the reasons which were likely to have motivated
Soviet policy was given when the Commission, at its January
Permanente-des-Congres de Navigation and in a special reunion at Geneva
of the Committee on Inland Transportation of the Economic Commission
for Europe. XIV id. at 188.
74 The observer emphasized that the Economic Commission for Europe was
always ready to help in the solution of legal and technical problems arising
in the field of Danubian navigation. XIV id. at 189.
75 Id at 209.
76 In 1951, at the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council, the
Danube Commission was tentatively included in a list of intergovernmental
organizations that the Secretary-General had been authorized to draw up
with a view toward establishing possible relationships between these organizations and the United Nations and toward possible absorption or integration of any of them into the United Nations' framework. The Soviet delegate immediately objected to such an inclusion on the grounds that the
Danube Commission had been founded as a result of action by the victorious nations after the Second World War and that, under Article 107 of
the United Nations' Charter, those powers alone, and not the United
Nations, were entitled to bear responsibility for it. The Western Powers,
in turn, pointed to the untenability of the Soviet interpretation under
which the United Nations would be unable to come to the aid of any state
or recognized territory created after World War II. Finally, at the fifteenth
session of the Council, the Secretary-General noted that the Danube Commission had not complied with his request for information and the Council,
over Soviet objection, voted to include the Commission on the list as of
1953. Following the reversal of Soviet policy, the permanent representative
of Hungary, in a note to the United Nations dated August 27, 1959, was more
communicative and characterized the Danube Commission as an intergovernmental, international organization with headquarters in Hungary. See
U.N. Doc. No. E/ECOSOC/SR.13/73 (1951) ; id. 15/676. at 20, 21 (1953) ;
U.N. Does. No. E/AC.24/SR. 73-76; Doc. E/2366, Annex II; Legislative

Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Legal Status, Privileges and

Immunities of International Organizations, II U.N. Leg. Ser. 34
ST/LEG/SER.B/11 (1961).
77 XV PROCES-VERBAUX 182.

Doe.
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1958 session, took under consideration the question of linking the
Danube basin with other European waterways such as the Rhine,
Oder and Vistula.78 The immense economic significance of such a
project and the importance of securing West Germany's participation in it, which seemed likely after her admission to the Commission, was all too.obvious to be overlooked by Soviet policy-makers.7 9
Perhaps the most significant event of the new era of cooperation within the Commission was the opening of the eighteenth
session (January 20-30, 1960) with Austria participating as a new
member.80 While, at the Belgrade Conference of 1948, the Western
Powers pressed hard for full Austrian participation, now the Austrian move of recognizing the cbmmunist-dictated Convention was
received with considerable disappointment as almost an unfriendly
act against the West. It was felt that Austrian accession to the
Convention was not really prompted by considerations of hardship
to Austria's shipping since the latter's bilateral agreements with
the other Danubian states enabled her ships to engage in commerce
along the communist-controlled sectors of the river."' Actually,
the decision to adhere to the Danube Convention was made known
after Austrian Chancellor Raab's visit to Moscow in July 1958. He
went to great lengths to explain that his country's pledged accession was not the price that Austria had to pay for the substantial
reduction of her reparations bill to Russia.82 Austria sought to
justify her step by contending that since she contributed to the
work of the Commission through the improvement of her navigational sector and was dependent on the results, she should also
have a voice in the decisions.8 3 Apart from this and the denied
quid pro quo, it must also be borne in mind that Austria is a landlocked country and the importance to her of the Danube as a means
of communication with the outside world cannot be overestimated.
Thus it is likely that Austria's expectation to capture a larger
share of the Danubian traffic constituted another reason for her
recognition of the Convention of 1948.84
78XVI id. at 194; 12 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 256 (Spring 1958).
79 The project has particular significance if viewed in the light of an all-water

route between the Danube and the Volga which Russia reportedly has been
planning. See Pravda, October 12, 1961, p. 2. Consult also A. Lebed, Die
Bedeutung der Wasserstrasse zwischen Ostsee und Schwarzem Meer, SOWIET
STUDIEN 96-109 (1962).
S XVIII PROCES-VERBAUX 265.
81 Haeseler, Die internationale Rechtsregelung des Donauverkehrs, 2 OSTERREICHISCHE OST-HEFTE 251, 254-255 (1960).
82 Under the terms of the Agreement of July 24, 1958, by which the U.S.S.R.
agreed to the reduction of Austria's reparations payments, Austria undertook to adhere to the Danube Convention of 1948. Katzarov, Da8 Volkerrechtliche Statut der Donau, Neue Zurcher Zeitung Dec. 12, 1959, p. 5; 188
ECONOMIST 360 (1958).
83 New York Times, January 24, 1960, p. 17.
84 The total volume of Austrian freight traffic in 1960 was 6,202,000 tons
composed of 1,189,000 tons of domestic and 5,013,000 tons of international
cargoes, the latter including 1,304,000 tons of exports, 2,975,000 tons of
imports and 734,000 tons of transit cargoes. This compares to a total of
3,112,000 tons in 1955 which was composed of 284,000 tons of domestic
and 2,828,000 tons of international cargoes. U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION
FOR

EuRoPv,

ANNUAL

1961, 27 (1962).
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RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

The sixteen years which have elapsed since the Belgrade Conference indicate not only the vagaries of international politics as reflected in the Danube Commission's policies ranging from
Stalinist arbitrariness to what has been claimed to be "peaceful
coexistence" - but once more underline the great importance of
the Danube as a natural link between East and West. The hard
facts of economic and political geography, operating with the overall context of the world power process, seem to have prompted the
Soviet Union to change its policy of absolute domination and find
a conciliatory modus. vivendi with Yugoslavia within the Commission. A Danube which, during the early postwar years, was depressingly free from shipping held out little benefit to the Soviet
Union. s5 The shortage of river tonnage and the growing transportation problems of the satellite countries made the use of Austrian
and German ships increasingly desirable in Danubian navigation.
Only in this way could the Soviet Union hope to utilize effectively
the economic advantages of Danube transportation and facilitate
the fulfillment of its seven-year plan. Effects of the changed Soviet
policy are already apparent from recent statistics (Tables 1 and 2).
TABLE 1
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT ON THE DANUBE, 196086
Tonnage Classified by Origin and Destination
(in thousands of tons)
COUNTRY OF

COUNTRY OF DESTINATION

TOTAL

ORIGIN

EXPORTS
co

C6z,

U.S.S.R.

-

145

404

358

627

715 1,149

Rumania
Bulgaria

97
163

1

454
-

107
36

32
125

112
6

151
48

1

3

3

10

30

Yugoslavia

27

-

-

40

3,438

84 525
6 -

1,562
385

341

1

416,

(Continued Next Page)

85 While no reliable statistics are available, it was estimated that Danubian
traffic in the years 1945-1947 had hardly reached one-tenth of its prewar
86

volume. U.N., DEP'T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS OF EUROPE 13 (1948).
BULLETIN STATISTIQUE DE LA COMMISION DU DANUBE 40 (Budapest, 1961).
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TOTAL

ORIGIN

EXPORTS
co

Cd
W~.

cP4

Hungary

40

Czechoslovakia
Austria

33

C

- as
0bjO
0 ca
H '55

Cd
CU
tol
r.

C) a
4)O

-

-

115

39

93

-

59

233

-

24

33

5

13 111

234

4

10

109

304

West Germany -

5

27

28

25

-

Others
TOTAL
IMPORTS

6

2

1

15

525

191

564

297 1,167

0nct
0
91

17

325

5 177

731

611

-

1,304

1,508

1,423

740

-

683 1,224 1,601 2,975 1,138 760 10,409

TABLE 2
GOODS TRANSPORT CLASSIFIED BY PORT OF
7
LOADING OR UNLOADING."
(in thousands of tons)
Country in

Goods exported via
Danube

which ports
are situated

Transport
within the
country

Goods imported from
a nonDanubian
country

Total
goods
carried
on the
Danube

U.S.S.R.

1959
1960

2,602
3,438

1,455
1,247

172
191

4,229
4,876

Rumania

1959
1960

1,098
1,562

1,686
1,762

14
6

2,798
3,330

Bulgaria

1959
1960

492
385

806
1,010

1,334
1,397

Yugoslavia

1959
1960

313
416

2,768

36
2
1

Hungary

1959
1960

323
325

3,683
3,966

5
15

4,011
4,306

Czechoslovakia

1959
1960

572
731

544
575

477
525

1,593
1,831

Austria

1959
1960

1,257
1,304

1,078
1,189

-

2,335
2,493

87

Id. at 5.

2,487
3,185
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West Germany
TOTAL

1959

1,450

156

-

1,606

1960

1,508

191

-

1,699

1959

8,107

1960

9,669

-

12,708

-

20,393

740

23,117

It will be seen that in 1960 a total of 23.1 million tons of goods,
comprised of about 12.7 million tons of domestic and 10.4 million
tons of international cargoes, were transported on the Danube.
This is an increase of almost 3 million tons over the previous year's
total, and a jump of about 14 million tons over the estimated total
for 1955. Further significant gains are expected in the years ahead. 8
Likewise, it may be noted that the recent Soviet-supported
gestures of the Danube Commission in establishing contacts with
the United Nations and other international organizations do not
stem from purely
altruistic motives or from a policy of genuine
liberalization. 9 Apart from the long-standing technical experience
and know-how of these organizations, a loan from the United Nations would, for instance, be a valuable aid in the construction of
the proposed Oder-Morava-Danube canal, the expenses of which
would otherwise have to be primarily shared by Czechoslovakia
and Poland, the two countries which have the project most closely
at heart. Furthermore, the shifts which have taken place in the
policy of the Kremlin have not gone so far as to prevent Moscow
from retaining its control and from allowing itself sufficient leeway to return to its arbitrary policies should exigencies require it
in the future. While Austria has become a full-fledged member of
the Commission and eventual West German participation must be
regarded as a likely development, the increasing Western influence
will not be sufficient to offset the numerical preponderance of the
Soviet Union and its satellites. On the other hand, West Germany's
membership may be expected to operate as a further moderating
influence on the policies of the Commission and, at the same time,
is likely to be a step in the direction of strengthening trade and
possibly other contacts between the East and West. On the balance,
sixteen years after the ominous Belgrade Conference, it seems that
the Western Powers' loss of ground has been mitigated considerably
by recent developments within the Commission which hold out
some prospect for East-West European cooperation in regard to
Danubian navigation.
88After a few years delay, the Danube Commission, on the basis of data
received from the Danubian states and the Fluvial Administration of the
Lower Danube, prepared its "Grand Plan" for the first stage (1961-65)
of long-term Danube development and works which received unanimous
support just like many other technical, juridical and other reports in recent
years. XX PROCES-VERBAUX 347, 352, 353, 365. For a text of the plan, according to national sectors of the waterway, see id. at 586. Cf. note 70 supra.
89 At the twentieth session (January 24-February 7, 1962) of the Commission,
the Hungarian representative reiterated the importance of continued extension
of the international relations of the Commission. At this meeting, in addition to observers from the Federal Republic of Germany and the Economic
Commission for Europe, other unofficial delegates were present from the
World Meteorological Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Union des Chambres de Commerce Rhenane, a non-governmental
organization. XX PROCES-VERBAUx 337, 348.
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OPINIONS ON ULTIMATE FACTS: STATUS,
TRENDS, AND A NOTE OF CAUTION
by

WILLIAM

B.

STOEBUCK*

By way of example the problem may arise thus: In an action
for personal injuries allegedly caused by a boiler explosion, the
plaintiff puts on an expert witness, a boiler engineer. The expert,
having stated the results of personal investigation or in response
to a hypothetical question, is asked to state his opinion as to the
cause of the explosion. In some jurisdictions he will not be allowed
to do so, under the doctrine that an opinion may not be received
on an "ultimate fact," in this case the fact of causation.' It may be
variously stated that the testimony would be upon "the very question for the jury to decide" or that the opinion would "usurp
2 the
function of the jury" or "invade the province of the jury."
The purpose here is not to show that the "ultimate facts" rule
is unsound, for that has already been done by eminent authorities. 3
Rather, the purpose is to show the state of the law and the observable trends
in an area which has changed rapidly in the last ten
4
years.
The mist the gods drew about them on the battlefield before
Troy was no more dense than the one enshrouding the origins of
the rule. Its first application in American courts appears to be in
Vermont in January, 1840, in the case of Davis v. Fuller,5 where it
was held that witnesses could not testify to the cause of backwater in a river, on the alternate ground that this "was a mere
matter of opinion, on the point on trial .... ." Again the rule appears
in Louisiana in 1856,6 New York in 1863, 7 and Iowa in 1874.8 Within
this period of time a few other cases, though not applying the rule,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1 The facts are adapted from Redman v. Community Hotel Corp., 138 W. Va.

456, 76 S.E.2d 759 (1953).
2 "Invasion of the province of the jury," though often used, does not exuress
the ground of the objection adequately. As used in the old case of Durrell
v. Bederly, Holt N. P. 283, 171 Eng. Rep. 244 (1816), the phrase may
simply denote that the opinion or conclusion is one the jury itself would
be as capable of reaching as the witness. Thus, "invasion of the province
of the jury" does not distinguish between opinions on evidentiary facts
and opinions on ultimate facts. Frequent use of the phrase has contributed
to the confusion of an already confused doctrine.
3 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1920-21 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 12 (1954).
4 Writing in 1954, McCormick suggested that no court had gone so far as
to abandon the distinction between opinions on ultimate facts and on evidentiary facts. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 12 at 26 (1954). This has now
come to pass in several jurisdictions.
5 12 Vt. 178 (1840).
6 Marcy v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 11 La. Ann. 748 (1856).
7 Persse & Brooks Paper Works v. Willett, 24 N. Y. Super. Ct. (1 Rob.) 131
(1863) (accountant not allowed to conclude books showed firm to be "insolvent"). Not really an ultimate issue, but the court may have regarded
it as one.

8 Muldowney v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 39 Iowa 615 (1874). The case holds it was
error for a medical expert to conclude the deceased would have died even
with better medical care than he had. It appears to be the first to use the
words "ultimate fact" in excluding evidence.

OPINIONS ON ULTIMATE FACTS
may give recognition to itY After 1874 the rule is frequently encountered.
It has been suggested"° that the American rule may have come
from an 1821 English case. 1 There is no evidence of this, as the
early cases discussed in the preceding paragraph cite no authority
for the rule and give no indication of where they got it. In fact,
they state the rule casually in a matter-of-fact way, as though it
were too settled to require demonstration. However, the rule was
not a part of the English common-law background, 12 despite confusing language in some cases.1 3 The evidence treatises by Best and
Greenleaf make statements which, though probably not so intended,
are susceptible of giving rise to the "ultimate facts" rule; 1 4 but the
early cases did not cite these volumes, and indeed the treatises were
not in existence when the earliest American opinions were written.
So, the origins of the "ultimate facts" rule remain a mystery. Now
what of its current status?
Several jurisdictions have abolished the rule by the simple
9 Lincoln v. Saratoga & S.R.R., 23 Wend. 425 (1840) (in personal injury
action, businessmen may not give opinions on plaintiff's amount of lost
profits, since this is not, like matters of science, proper subject of expert
testimony) ; White v. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155 (1862) (medical expert may not
testify directly as to testatrix's "mental capacity" to make will, because
this is mixed question of fact and law); Snow v. Boston & M.R.R., 65 Me.
230 (1875) (proper for witness to testify directly to damage to property,
over objection this was very question for jury).
10 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1921, n. 1 (3d ed. 1940).
11 Rex v. Wright, Russ. & Ry. 456, 168 Eng. Rep. 895 (Cr. Cas. 1821). While
not reversing, some of the judges had "doubts" as to whether, in a murder
trial where insanity was the defense, an expert could conclude the defendant's act was "an act of insanity." The court failed to recognize this as
a mixed question of fact and law, a failure that has plagued many courts
and which will be discussed later herein.
12 Folkes v. Chadd, 3 Doug. 157. 99 Eng. Rep. 589 (K. B. 1782). wherein
Lord Mansfield held it was proper for an expert engineer to give his opinion
on the cause of a harbor's filling up, which was an ultimate issue.
3
1: Jameson v. Drinkald, 12 Moore C. P. 148, 22 Eng. C. L. 636 (1826), in
which two justices felt expert seamen should not give opinions on who was
at "fault" in a ship collision, though they might state the "cause" of the
collision. Durrell v. Bederley, Holt N. P. 283, 171 Eng. Rep. 244 (1816),
which says it was the "province of a jury" to decide whether the insured
should have disclosed certain information to the insurer, but on the ground
that this question, unlike a question of science, was conjectural and not a
proper subject of expert testimony.
14 BEST, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 924-27 (1st Am. ed. 1876);
GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE

491-92 (13th ed. 1876).
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technique of abandoning any distinction between opinions on ultimate facts and opinions on evidentiary facts. This is the state of
the law in the Fourth Circuit, 15 Alaska, 16 Colorado, 7 Iowa,'" and
WaShington. 19 New Hampshire seems never to have had the rule. 20
It is probable, though less than certain, that the rule has no application in the Third Circuit 2 ' and Maryland. 22 In dictum, the First

15 Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1956) : held, government
expert witnesses could testify that entries in books of account were "false."
Rationale: if the opinion aids the jury, it should be admitted whether or not
on an ultimate fact.
16Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1961): held, in an arson trial,
the state fire marshal could testify that the fire was "of incendiary origin."
If the opinion is otherwise admissible, it is no objection that it is on an
ultimate fact.
17 Bridges v. Lintz, 140 Colo. 582, 346 P.2d 571 (1959) : held, in an auto
accident case, a police investigator could give an opinion that the defendant's excessive speed was the "cause" of the accident. The court says the
fact that causation was an ultimate issue "does not of itself furnish a
basis for its rejection." While denying it does so, the court by implication
overrules its prior cases of Weng v. Schleiger, 130 Colo. 90, 273 P.2d 356
(1954) (invasion of province of jury for policeman to testify defendant
guilty of "inattention to driving"); and Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co.,
17 Colo. 146, 28 Pac. 966 (1892) (expert could not testify to availability
of water in irrigation ditch). There is also contrary dictum in the prior
case of Pueblo v. Ratliff, 137 Colo. 468, 327 P.2d 270 (1958) (cause of
accident). St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952),
and Herren v. People, 28 Colo. 23, 62 Pac. 833 (1900), though not facing
the "ultimate facts" issue as such, hold that a pathologist may testify to
the cause of death. But see McNelley v. Smith, 149 Colo. 177, 368 P.2d 555
(1962), which casts a shadow across Bridges. It reaches a contrary result
on weak reasoning and with a similar fact pattern, though it expressly
reaffirms Bridges. The Colorado court, having failed to deal with its prior
cases in the Bridges case, and in view of the McNelley case, should take
the first opportunity to make it clear that the "ultimate facts" rule is gone.
18 Grismore v. Consolidated Prods. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942),
the leading American case, holds that an expert may state his opinion on
the cause of death of turkeys. While it might be argued that the case goes
no further than to abandon the "ultimate facts" rule as to experts' testimony, the court's language expressly repudiating the rule and the authorities relied upon show complete abandonment was intended. See also Miller
v. Miller, 237 Iowa 978, 23 N.W.2d 760 (1946) (in guardianship hearing,
doctor could testify that respondent "should have someone to help him
with his financial affairs"). Cf. In re Ransom's Estate, 244 Iowa 343, 57
N.W.2d 89 (1953), which holds that a witness could not state that the
testator was "incompetent" (to make a will) on the correct ground that
this was a mixed question of law and fact.
19 Gerberg v. Crosby, 52 Wash. 2d 792, 329 P.2d 184 (1958) (cause of accident), an enlightened opinion in which the court "avoids the technical
semantic argument over what is and what is not an ultimate fact." See also
Lynch v. Republic Publishing Co., 40 Wash. 2d 379, 243 P.2d 636 (1952)
(experts allowed to testify on ultimate fact). Cf. Billington v. Schaal, 42
Wash. 2d 878, 259 P.2d 634 (1953) (police officer not allowed to testify
that defendant violated ordinance and was negligent, but court fails to
recognize these as questions of law).
20 Rau v. First Nat'l Stores, 97 N.H. 490, 92 A.2d 921 (1952) : held, in a
wrongful death action against a store, the defendant's officer could state
that customers would not expect the place of injury to be an area for public
use. "If the opinion expressed will be of aid to the jury and the witness
is qualified to speak, 'it is admissible, even though it bears directly on a
main issue.'
21 United States v. kugustine, 189 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1951): in an income
tax evasion trial, federal agents could testify that certain items were not
"allowable expenses" and that corporate profits should have-been more than
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23
Circuit has repudiated the "ultimate facts" rule.

Another group of courts, by holding that an expert, as opposed
tc a lay witness, may state an opinion on an ultimate fact, has
abandoned a large part of the rule. These jurisdictions typically
assert the "ultimate facts" rule, then create an exception for experts. This appears to be the current view in the United States
Supreme Court,24 the Fifth Circuit, 25 the Eighth Circuit, 26 Arthe books showed. "But the witnesses in this case were by no means 'usurp-

ing' any jury function, whatever that means."
Shivers v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585, 165 A.2d 898 (1960): a doctor could
testify to the extent of injury. The court's rationale, relying heavily on
McCormick and Wigmore, appears to reject entirely any distinction between
evidentiary and ultimate facts.
23 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Frost, 164 F.2d 542 (1st Cir. 1947) : in an action
on a disability policy, an expert should have been allowed to state whether
the insured "suffered any impairment of the mind"; but the court recognizes this was not an ultimate issue.
24 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Watson, 190 U.S. 287 (1903)
(expert, in answer to
hypothetical question, could state whether locomotive that allegedly started
fires had "anything wrong about the operation or construction.
... );
Transportation Line v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297 (1877) (expert allowed to state
whether it would be "safe or prudent" to tow three barges abreast on
Chesapeake Bay, though ultimate fact). These cases should not be, but
often are, confused with United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498 (1935),
a suit on a military war-risk policy of insurance. The Court held that
medical experts could not testify that the plaintiff-insured was "totally
and permanently disabled," since this, involving an interpretation of the
words of the policy, was an opinion on a question of law.
25 In Kennelley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1960), it was
held that an expert could state what the "probable" result of an injury
"would" have been, in response to a hypothetical question. The court said
an expert was permitted by both Texas and the Fifth Circuit to answer
a hypothetical question on ultimate facts. Presumably the answer would
have to be in the subjunctive mood.
26 Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 220 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1955): a police
investigator could testify that the accident occurred in the left lane of
traffic, the rule being that "'an expert witness may properly be asked his
opinion on an ultimate fact.'" Accord, Mutual Benefit Health & Acc..Ass'n
v. Francis, 148 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1945) (cause of death); and Builders
Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950), which holds corporate officers, in an action to redetermine a tax deficiency, should have
been allowed to testify that their salaries were "reasonable." Does this
involve a legal question of interpretation of tax law? Compare these cases
with Hawkins v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 188 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1951) (cause
of injury) ; Cropper v. Titanium Pigment Co., 47 F.2d 1038 (8th Cir. 1931)
(cause of physical condition) ; and the leading case of United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 166 Fed. 407 (8th Cir. 1909) (safety of scaffold). The
latter cases state that experts may give opinions on ultimate facts, but
22
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kansas 27 California, 28 Idaho, 29 Michigan, 30 Minnesota, 31 Missouri,3 2
33
Nevada,
North Carolina, 34 and Wisconsin. 3' Arizona has twice
add the further requirement that the opinions be ones laymen would not
be capable of forming. This may be a distinction without a difference,
since an expert's opinion is normally thought of as being one laymen could
not form and since the two groups of cases are cited interchangeably by
the Eighth Circuit.
27 Lee v. Crittenden County, 216 Ark. 480, 226 S.W.2d 79 (1950): an expert
was allowed to state that falling of the defendant's elevator shaft instead
of a high wind was the cause of the collapse of the plaintiff's radio tower,
"although the point covered by the inference is precisely the one on which
the tribunal is to pass ......
28 People v. Martinez, 38 Cal. 2d 556, 241 P.2d 224 (1952) : in a murder trialwhere the defense was that intoxication prevented formation of specific
intent, a medical expert could state whether a person in the defendant's
state of intoxication could understand his actions would cause death. People
v. Wilson, 25 Cal. 2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944): in an abortion trial a
medical expert could conclude that the abortion was "not performed in
order to preserve her life"; the rationale is not as clear as in Martinez.
29 Hayhurst v. Boyd Hosp., 43 Idaho 661, 254 Pac. 528 (1927) : in a negligence
suit against a hospital, a doctor could testify that the plaintiff did not
receive "proper care." The court cites Wigmore, "where the fallacy of the
'usurpation' theory is discussed," suggesting it might have been willing
to abandon the rule entirely. Compare Cochran v. Gritman, 34 Idaho 654,
203 Pac. 289 (1921), where the court says an expert may give his opinion
on ultimate facts, but only in the subjunctive mood in response to a hypothetical question.
30 Cabana v. City of Hart, 327 Mich. 287, 42 N.W.2d 97 (1950): an expert
may state a conclusion on an ultimate fact, but only in the subjunctive
mood.
31 State v. Schwartz, 122 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1963) (in rape trial medical
expert could state that complainant had intercourse) ; Krueger v. Knutson,
261 Minn. 144, 111 N.W.2d 526 (1961) (medical expert allowed to give
opinion on extent of injuries) ; Albert Lea Ice & Fuel Co.v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 239 Minn. 198, 58 N.W.2d 614, 617 (1953) (expert could
testify that wind caused collapse of icehouse). "Moreover, it has long been
the rule in this state that the fact that the opinion of an expert bears
directly upon the issue to be determined by the jury does not render it
inadmissible."
32 Eickmann v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 651, 253 S.W.2d 122, 130
(1952) : a doctor may testify that the plaintiff's complaint of pain "did not
appear to be bona fide." "An objection that an expert opinion invades the
province of the jury is not a valid one." State v. Paglino, 319 S.W.2d 613
(Mo. 1958) (expert could testify fire caused by arson); Cole v. Uhlmann
Grain Co., 340 Mo. 277, 100 S.W.2d 311 (1936): dictum that it is not a
valid objection that an expert opinion "invades the province of the jury."
But see Linam v. Murphy, 360 Mo. 1140, 232 S.W.2d 937 (1950), which
holds that a pilot's "buzzing" of a dam violated C.A.B. rules and regulations, on the ground that these were "ultimate facts." Quaere: Is this not
really a question of law, upon which no witness should give an opinion?
83McLeod v. Miller & Lux, 40 Nev. 447, 153 Pac. 566 (1915): experts could
testify whether the defendant's dam caused a river to sand and flood, but
non-experts could not.
34 Bruce v. O'Neal Flying Serv., 234 N.C. 79, 66 S.E.2d 312 (1951): flying
experts could testify that a pilot's attempting to do too many spins caused
the crash. The court said a witness generally may not give an opinion on
ultimate facts, but that experts are an exception. State v. Powell, 238 N.C.
527, 78 S.E.2d 248 (1953), followed Bruce, but the question was not really
on an ultimate fact, though the court treated it as so being. Cf. dictum in
Lipe v. Guilford Nat'l Bank, 236 N.C. 328, 72 S.E.2d 759 (1952), that a
witness could not conclude that a contract had been "fulfilled." The court
fails to recognize it as a mixed law-fact question.
33Kreyer v. Farmers' Co-op Lumber Co., 189 Wis. 2d 67, 117 N.W.2d 646
(1962): in answer to a hypothetical question, an expert was allowed to
testify that a barn fire "was" (not subjunctive mood) caused by faulty
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stated in dictum that expert opinion
3 6 will not be excluded merely
because it deals with ultimate facts.
As a practical matter, the cases allowing expert opinions on
ultimate facts constitute a substantial deviation from the entire
rule. To be sure, in theory there are two generally recognized
exceptions to the so-called rule that witnesses must state observed
facts and not opinions: experts may state conclusions on matters
within their expert knowledge, 37 and laymen may state conclusional impressions in certain instances under the "collective facts"
rule.38 In practice, the large majority of cases involving the "ultimate facts" rule are those where the opinion is by an expert.
Further, some of those courts which have relaxed the rule only as
to experts have done so in terms suggesting they might, if squarely
presented the problem, abandon it as to lay opinions also.35 The
exception nearly eats up the rule.
wiring. The court stated that an expert might give an opinion on an ultimate fact, "but only on a hypothetical question." However, in Fehrman v.
Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963), a malpractice case, a doctor
who had examined the plaintiff was allowed to testify that his affliction
was "not due to negligence or malpractice" on the defendant's part. The
case goes too far. Not only does it ignore the "hypothetical question" requirement of Kreyer (salutary in itself if the court had recognized what
it was doing), but it allows an opinion on a mixed question of law and fact.
36 Allied Van Lines, Inc., v. Parsons, 80 Ariz. 88, 293 P.2d 430 (1956) ; Watson
v. Southern Pac. Co., 62 Ariz. 29, 152 P.2d 665 (1944). Parsons states that
the language in Watson constitutes a holding. Compare Alires v. Southern
Pac. Co., 93 Ariz. 97, 378 P.2d 913 (1963), which is not necessarily inconsistent with the above cases.
37 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1923 (3d ed. 1940).
88 Id. § 1924.
39 Likely candidates are California, Idaho, Missouri, and the Eighth Circuit.
See nn. 28, 29, 32, and 26, supra.
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A third group of jurisdictions has relaxed the "ultimate facts"
rule by holding that an expert may state a conclusion on such
facts, provided the conclusion is one laymen would not be capable
of drawing. The jurisdictions are: the Sixth Circuit, 40 the Tenth
46
45
Circuit,

41

Alabama,

42

Florida,

43

Illinois,

44

Kansas,

Maryland,

Peoples Gas Co. v. Fitzgerald, 188 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1951): in a wrongful death action, experts could testify to the cause of a gas explosion, on
the ground that an expert may state an opinion "in a matter which is
not one of common knowledge . . . . " Cf. Dickerson v. Shepard Warner
Elevator Co. 287 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1961) (expert may state opinion on
cause of accident).
41 Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 162 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1947), aff'd on other
issues, 333 U.S. 445 (1948) : a pathologist could give an opinion that the
engineer was dead of a heart attack when the collision occurred, on the
ground that this was a subject upon which jurors were unfamiliar. Was it
an ultimate issue?
42 Marigold Coal, Inc., v. Thames, 274 Ala. 421, 149 So. 2d 276 (1963) : an expert was allowed to testify that a dynamite charge was "excessive" and that
blasting was "improperly done." The court states that an expert may not
testify to a matter of common knowledge. Watson v. Hardaway-Covington
Cotton Co., 223 Ala. 443, 137 So. 33 (1931) : without giving facts, the court
says an expert may conclude on a "material issue" if the jury is not capable
of doing so. But cf. Case v. English, 255 Ala. 555, 52 So. 2d 216 (19551):
a witness could not state that the testator was "not capable of making and
executing a valid will," as this was the "very issue to be submitted to the
jury." It was really a mixed law-fact question.
43 Diecidue v. State, 119 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1960) : a police officer was allowed
to state his opinion that a "lottery" was going on in the defendant's home,
since the jury was not qualified to recognize a lottery. But cf. Ippolito v.
40
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49
Montana, 4 Ohio,48 Oregon, Pennsylvania,"

Tennessee,

1

Texas,

2

Brener, 89 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1956), which holds, without stating the theory
relied upon, that an accident investigator could not state the side of the
road on which an accident occurred.
44 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Roberts, 229 Ill. 481, 82 N.E. 401 (1907): a
doctor could testify to the cause of injury, as the jury could not form such
a conclusion, even if it had the facts. Apparently, however, Illinois requires
the expert to state his conclusion in the subjunctive mood. Turnbow v. Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc., 15 Ill. App. 2d 57, 145 N.E.2d 377 (1957) : a medical expert invaded the province of the jury by concluding "the accident is the
cause of epilepsy;" he should have said it "could" have been. Compare
Goddard v. Enzler, 222 Ill. 462, 78 N.E. 805 (1906) : an expert was competent
to testify how a lethal electrical shock "might" have occurred, since "the"
ultimate question was not that but "negligence."
45 Tovey v. Geiser, 150 Kan. 149, 92 P.2d 3 (1939) : in a case where a husband
and wife were asphyxiated in their home, physicians could testify which one
survived the longer, since the jury's "reasoning powers" were not such that
they could reach their own conclusion.
46 Langenfelder v. Thompson, 179 Md. 502, 20 A.2d 491 (1941) : a doctor could
state the probable cause of injury, since the jury was not capable of a conclusion on this subject.
4 Kelley v. John R. Daily Co.. 56 Mont. 63. 181 Pac. 326 (1919) : a medical
expert could testify that food poisoning caused an illness, because his conclusion depended upon professional knowledge. Compare In re Miller's
Estate, 71 Mont. 330, 229 Pac. 851 (1924), where a lawyer, basing his opinion in part upon his "reading of the different law books," should not have
testified that it was improbable the deceased wrote a holographic will. The
court does not mention the "ultimate fact" rule, nor does it recognize the
question as one of mixed law and fact.
's Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E.2d 156
(1949): a pathologist could state an opinion on the cause of death, since a
"well recognized exception" to the "ultimate facts" rule allows an expert
opinion when it is one "beyond the experience, knowledge or comprehension
of the jury .... "
19 Oregon may have gone further. Ritter v. Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 358 P.2d 1080
(1961), holds that an architect could state that a ramp, upon which the
plaintiff fell, was too steep and was "unsafe." This was an ultimate fact
which could not be "equally well decided by the jury from the same evi" Schweiger v. Solbeck, 191 Ore. 454, 230 P.2d 195 (1951), has
dence ....
language that it is impossible for an expert to usurp the function of the
jury and purports to follow Wigmore; but strictly the case contains only
a statement that it was non-reversible error to exclude an engineer's opinion on the cause of a mudslide. Goldfoot v. Lofgren, 135 Ore. 533, 296 Pac.
843 (1931), holds that a doctor could testify to the cause of abscesses, on
the ground that an "expert" cannot usurp the function of the jury. Again,
the court relies on Wigmore, but he would abandon the "ultimate facts"
rule as to experts and non-experts alike.
50Commonwealth v. Nasuti, 385 Pa. 436, 123 A.2d 435 (1956): fire captains
were allowed to state an ultimate fact that a fire was "of incendiary origin,"
since this was a subject upon which the jury could not form its own conclusion. However, the court stated that "the" ultimate fact was guilt.
51 National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Follett, 168 Tenn. 647, 80 S.W.2d 92
(1935): in a suit on an accidental death policy, doctors could testify that
the accident caused death, because only an expert was qualified to form
such an opinion. Casteel v. Southern Ry., 187 Tenn. 586, 216 S.W.2d 321
(1948): dictum that a railroad engineer could testify that he did everything possible to avoid running over the deceased.
52 Welch v Shaver, 351 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961): in a malpractice
action, a physician could testify that the defendant should not have performed surgery on the plaintiff, since the opinion was one laymen could
not intelligently form. Cf. White v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 339, 306 S.W.2d
903 (1957), which holds that a pathologist could testify that the cause of
death of a murder victim was "asphyxia by strangulation"; but the court
says the ultimate issue was whether she died from "strangulation with a
wire." But see Cordero v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 160, 297 S.W.2d 174 (1956)
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and Utah.53 In Oregon and Utah, there is some reason to think the
courts
might be willing wholly to abandon the "ultimate facts"
54
rule.
The group of courts just listed states that an expert may give
an opinion on ultimate facts, provided the opinion is one the jury
is not qualified to form. The group preceding it allows an expert
to give an opinion on ultimate facts, without this proviso. Strictly
analyzed, the two groups are enunciating the same rule. The justification for an expert's giving an opinion at all, even on evidentiary
facts, is that hp can add something beyond what the jury can
determine for itself.55 Thus, the courts which add the proviso are
only stating the reason for the expert opinion rule and are not
adding a qualification to it. This ought to be the analysis and
probably is in some jurisdictions; just which ones is conjectural.
In a fourth group of jurisdictions, the courts have relaxed the
"ultimate facts" rule to some degree, but the cases evade classification. Maine,5 6 Mississippi,57 Nebraska,58 North Dakota, 59 and Ver(beating and kicking "would" be "calculated" to cause severe injury); the
witneds must answer in the subjunctive mood. See Morton Inv. Co. v. Trevey,
8 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928): where the ultimate issue was the cause
of an elevator's falling, an expert could testify to the cause and could state
that the condition of certain fittings "would show negligence." Apparently
unintentionally, the court goes too far in allowing an opinion on the lawfact question of negligence. See generally NORVELL, INVASION OF THE
PROVINCE OF THE JURY,

31 Texas L. Rev. 731 (1953), a good discussion of

the "ultimate facts" rule, with emphasis on Texas law. Judge Norvell felt
the rule in Texas allowed an expert to state a conclusion on ultimate facts
when the jury would not be qualified to reach such a conclusion.
53 Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hosp., 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d
330 (1957): in a wrongful death action against a hospital, a nurse could
testify that the deceased received "good nursing care." The rationale is
that the opinion was beyond the knowledge of laymen, but the court also
states the broader proposition that it is no objection that an expert's testimony is on "the very issue before the jury." Other even more sweeping
language gives the impression that it may have been the court's intention
to abolish the "ultimate facts" rule entirely. Cf. Hooper v. General Motors
Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549 (1953) : held, an expert could testify to
the ultimate fact of cause of an accident, but the court expressly limits its
opinion to expert opinions on causation.
54 See nn. 49 and 53, supra.
55 This principle is best expressed in 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1918, 1923 (3d
ed. 1940).
56 State v. Wardwell, 158 Me. 307, 183 A.2d 896 (1962) : where the accused
was charged with murder by strangulation, a pathologist could testify that
death was caused by strangulation. Without a general discussion of the
"ultimate facts" rule, the court simply says the testimony was "a proper
expression of opinion."
5T Mississippi Power Co. v. Harrison, 247 Miss. 400, 152 So. 2d 892 (1963)
experts should have been allowed to give opinions on the cause of a fire.
The court's reasoning is inadequate and does not recognize an "ultimate
facts" issue.
58 Petracek v. Haas 0. K. Rubber Welders, Inc., 176 Neb. 438, 126 N.W.2d
466 (1964): experts properly testified that loose lug bolts caused an auto
accident. The court says it is "ordinarily" error to permit experts to state
opinions on the ultimate fact, but that an exception exists "if the case is
one to be wholly resolved by such evidence." The reasoning is singular: the
justification for the "ultimate facts" rule seems to be that, though an expert
might give an opinion on an evidentiary fact, he does more harm when he
"usurps the jury's function" on the "very question for the jury to resolve."
59 State v. Maresch, 75 N.D. 229, 27 N.W.2d 1 (1947) : in a murder trial
experts were allowed to conclude that the victim's injuries could not have
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mont 60 have decisions allowing experts to state conclusions on
the cause of an event or condition. However, the language of the
cases is such that they should not be extended beyond their own
facts. Oklahoma presents a confu?.ing situation, apparently generally
applying the "ultimate facts" rule, but allowing expert opinions on
speed of automobiles, though not on the cause of accidents.6 1 The
District of Columbia Court of Municipal Appeals has held, in a
trial for driving under the influence of alcohol, that a police officer
could testify the accused was intoxicated; however, the court
did not discuss the "ultimate facts" issue.62 In Louisiana an accountant has been allowed to testify that a defendant, accused of
knowingly making false entries in bank books, did make "false"
entries, on the theory that his conclusion did not cover the entire
question of guilt. 63 A psychiatric opinion on "sanity" was permitted
in a Massachusetts murder case, the court finding no objection to
its being "the precise point to be determined by the jury. ' 64 Finally,
the Seventh Circuit, without discussing the "ultimate facts" issue,
been sustained by falling on some inanimate object. The court says this was
an ultimate fact (was it?) and that, though expert opinions are not generally allowed on such facts, they may be as to cause of an injury.
60 Baldwin v. Gaines, 92 Vt. 61, 102 At. 338 (1917) : in a malpractice action,
a medical expert could testify that the manner in which the defendant
splinted a leg "would" have caused a deformity. The court recognizes the
"familiar rule" but holds that an exception allows experts to give opinions
on the cause of a "condition." Although the answer was in the subjunctive
mood, the decision does not express a preference for this form.
61 Kelso v. Independent Tank Co., 348 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1960): an accident
investigator may not testify to the cause of a collision, since this "invades
the province of the jury." Andrews v Moery, 205 Okla. 635, 240 P.2d 447
(1951) (expert may testify to speed, based upon skid marks). Cf. Washita
Valley Grain Co. v. McElroy, 262 P.2d 133 (Okla. 1953) : an expert could
not give his conclusion that the plaintiff was not "negligent," because an
expert cannot state an opinion on "facts in issue." The court fails to identify the mixed question of law and fact. But see Auten v. Livingston, 201
Okla. 467, 207 P.2d 256 (1949), which held it was error, but non-reversible,
for a witness to testify that the plaintiff was injured through his own
"negligence." But see Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Board of Educ., 201
Okla. 250, 204 P.2d 982 (1948), which contains dictum that "expert" testimony is admissible on ultimate facts. Oklahoma needs to clarify its law.
62 Woolard v. District, 62 A.2d 640 (D.C.Mun. App. 1948).
63 State v Cloutier, 181 La. 222, 159 So. 330 (1935).
64 Commonwealth v. Chapin, 333 Mass. 610, 132 N.E.2d 404 (1956). The court,
relying on 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1921 (3d ed. 1940), which urges abandonment of the "ultimate facts" rule, creates the impression that it might
further relax the rule.
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has held in a personal injury action that a physician could 6 state
his
5
opinion on the extent of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
Some conclusions seem justified at this point. First, from an
actual count of the jurisdictions cited above, it is clear that a majority of the American courts do not apply the "ultimate facts"
rule in full force. It would be more accurate to state the general
rule thus: A qualified expert may state an opinion on an ultimate
fact if the subject is one upon which laymen would be unable to
form an intelligent opinion. This is not to say the "ultimate facts"
rule has no application, for it seems to be in full sway in a few
jurisdictions.6 6 A minority does apply the rule that a witness,
expert or lay, may not state an opinion on an ultimate fact.
Second, an examination of the dates of the cases cited above
indicates that the trend is toward relaxation or abandonment of the
rule. With the exception of New Hampshire, which seems never
to have had it, the jurisdictions abolishing the rule have done so
since the Grismore case 67 in 1942. Indeed, it may be tentatively
said that the modern tendency is toward complete abandonment
and that this is an accelerating movement.
Since at least 182168 the courts have been plagued with a confusion of ultimate facts with questions of law or of mixed fact and
that a party was
occur where the witness testifies
law. This may
69
70
"negligent,"

"incapable of making a will,"

or "competent to make

a gift. '7 1 One court failed to recognize whether a contract was
65 Greer v. Hendrix, 69 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1934).
66 See for example Willoughby v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 198 F.2d 604 (D.C.Cir.
1952) (unsafe condition); Smith v. Hardy, 228 S.C. 112, 88 S.E.2d 865
(1955) (cause of accident); Redman v. Community Hotel Corp., 138 W.Va.
456, 76 S.E.2d 759 (1953) (cause of boiler explosion) ; and Macy v. Billings,
74 Wyo. 404, 289 P.2d 422 (1955) (cause of accident).
67 Grismore v. Consolidated Prods. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942).
68 Rex v. Wright, Russ. & Ry. 456, 168 Eng. Rep. 895 (Cr. Cas. 1821): a
witness testified in a murder trial that the defendant's act of drowning
his son was "an act of insanity." Several of the judges thought this "the
very point the jury were to decide."
69 Auten v. Livingston, 201 Okla. 467, 207 P.2d 256 (1949) (court says "negligence" was ultimate fact) ; Pointer v. Klamath Falls Land & Transp. Co.,
59 Ore. 438, 117 Pac. 605 (1911) (court held "careless, reckless, or negligent" was ultimate fact); Morton Inv. Co. v. Trevey, 8 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928) ("negligence" not identified as question of mixed law and
fact); Billington v. Schaal, 42 Wash. 2d 878, 259 P.2d 634 (1953) ; Fehrman
v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963) ("negligence or malpractice,"
in malpractice action, not identified as law-fact question). Compare these
cases with Grismore v. Consolidated Prods. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d
646 (1942), where the court discusses the problem and identifies "negligence"
and other questions of mixed law and fact.
70 Case v. English, 255 Ala. 555, 52 So. 2d 216 (1951) ("not capable of making
and executing a valid will"). Compare with In re Rich's Estate, 79 Cal. App.
2d 22, 179 P.2d 373 (1947) ; Smoot v. Alexander, 188 Ga. 203, 3 S.E.2d 593
(1939); In re Ransom's Estate, 244 Iowa 343, 57 N.W.2d 89 (1953); White
v. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155 (1862); and In re Tatum's Will, 233 N.C. 723, 65
S.E.2d 351 (1951); where the question was identified as one of law or of
mixed law and fact.
71 No confusion existed in Holton v. Ellis, 114 Vt. 471, 49 A.2d 210 (1946),
where the court recognized "competent to make a gift" as a law-fact question. Cf. Miller v. Miller, 237 Iowa 978, 23 N.W.2d 760 (1946), where, in
a guardianship action, the court held that "he should have someone to help
him with his financial affairs" was a question of fact.

OPINIONS ON ULTIMATE FACTS

"fulfilled" as being a law-fact question, 72 but another noted that
testimony about an "intention or purpose to defraud" might involve such a question. 73 Similarly, the opinions sometimes fail to
distinguish between law and fact when witnesses give opinions on
statutory violations.7 4 Borderline questions exist when a witness
states a conclusion in language that is both
a legal word of art 76
and
a term used by laymen, such as "fault" 75 or "proximate result.
A witness cannot be allowed to give an opinion on a question
of law, 77 and this upon considerations quite different from the
supposed objection to opinions on ultimate facts. In order to justify
having courts resolve disputes between litigants, it must be posited
as an a priori assumption that there is one, but only one, legal
answer for every cognizable dispute. There being only one applicable legal rule for each dispute or issue, it requires only one spokesman of the law, who of course is the judge. This may rest upon a
legal fiction, but one more vital to the system and no more contrived than, say, the presumption of innocence. To allow anyone
other than the judge to state the law would violate the basic concept. Reducing the proposition to a more practical level, it would
be a waste of time if witnesses or counsel should duplicate the
judge's statement of the law, and it would intolerably confound
the jury to have it stated differently.
Witnesses should not state the law; neither should courts confuse ultimate facts with questions of law. Confusion there has
been aplenty, and it has produced two kinds of odd results. First,
many cases have found fault with testimony on "ultimate facts"
when the testimony was actually on a question of law or of law
and fact. 78 Such cases reach the right result on the wrong ground.
Courts relaxing or abandoning the "ultimate facts" rule should not
compound the confusion by sweepingly overruling cases involving
testimony on legal questions. Second, a few courts, perhaps in their
eagerness to forsake the "ultimate facts" rule, have labeled opin72 Lipe v. Guilford Nat'l Bank, 236 N.C. 328, 72 S.E.2d 759 (1952).
73 Hathaway v. Brown, 22 Minn. 214 (1875).
74 E.g., Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950)
("reasonable" corporate expenses under Internal Revenue Code); Williams
v. Gurwitz, 99 Cal. App. 2d 801, 222 P.2d 673 (1950) (whether party in
accident "violated the right of way"); Gulf Oil Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 101, 53 A.2d 250 (1947) ("machinery" and "manufacturing"
under tax statute; possible confusion). Cf. Lee Moor Contracting Co. v.
Blanton, 49 Ariz. 130, 65 P.2d 35 (1937) (whether defendant was driving
in "careful, lawful and prudent manner").
75 Dermott Grocery & Comm'n Co. v. Meyer, 193 Ark. 591, 101 S.W.2d 443
(1937) ("fault" was "the very question to be determined by the jury");
Giamattei v. DiCerbo, 133 Conn. 139, 62 A.2d 519 (1948) ("at fault;" apparently not properly identified).
76 Underwood v. Smith, 262 Ala. 181, 73 So. 2d 717 (1954) ("proximate result"
stated to be mixed law-fact question).
77 Except of course where the law of a foreign. jurisdiction Is to be proved.
78 See nn. 67-74, supra. Also see, for example, Case v. English, 255 Ala. 555,
52 So. 2d 216 (1951) (capacity to make will) ; Lee Moor Contracting Co. v.
Blanton, 49 Ariz. 130, 65 P.2d 35 (1937) ("careful, lawful and prudent");
Williams v. Gurwitz, 99 Cal. App. 2d 801, 222 P.2d 673 (1950) ("violated
the right of way"); Pointer v. Klamath Falls Land & Transp. Co., 59 Ore.
438, 117 Pac. 605 (1911) ("negligent"; often cited and great source of
confusion); Billington v. Schaal, 42 Wash. 2d 878, 259 P.2d 634 (1953)
(statutory violation).
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ions on the law opinions on ultimate facts and have sanctioned
them. 79 Here too the courts should be sedulous to observe the distinction, keeping out the bad as well as letting in the good evidence.
In the borderline situations, of which examples were given above,
it might do to require the witness to define his terms, to make it
clear no statement of the law was intended.
The probability is that more and more jurisdictions will abandon or drastically relax the "ultimate facts" rule. Courts considering
a modernization of their law might profitably adopt the rationale
of the pathfindef case, Grismore v. ConsolidatedProds. Co.,80 where
a lengthy, scholarly examination of the rule is undertaken. For a
model of clarity and brevity, recourse should be had to Oxenberg
v. State,81 which performs the cleanest surgery yet on the rule.
Finally, it is to be hoped that the courts will not confuse ultimate
facts with questions of law, neither overruling decisions which
prohibit opinions on the law nor allowing witnesses to state such
opinions.
79 E.g.,

builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950)
("reasonable" corporate expenses under Internal Revenue Code) ; Morton
Inv. Co. v. Trevey, 8 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ("negligence");
Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963) ("negligence or
malpractice").
80232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942).
81 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1961). The case states simply that it is no ground for
objection that an opinion is on an ultimate issue.
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THE PRIVATE AUTOPSY: PROBLEMS OF CONSENT
FOREWORD

In the hospital practice of pathology, the problem of proper
authority to perform a private autopsy on the body of a deceased
patient arises regularly. While numerous articles' have investigated
the authority of the coroner, the medical examiner and, in some
jurisdictions, the district attorney, to authorize an autopsy, little
has been said concerning the post-mortem examination which has
no initial medical-legal implications.
Every state, through the exercise of its police power, has. some
mechanism by which the body of a person who dies under "suspicious" circumstances can be examined. 2 But the great majority
of autopsies are not of this type; many more are performed for
purely medical reasons and must be authorized by some person
who possesses sufficient interest in the body to do so. To facilitate
the obtaining of this required permission, hospitals generally have
a form designed to satisfy the legal requirements.3 When the patient
1 See, e.g., Black, Authority of Coroner to Order Autopsy, At Common Law

and Under South Carolina Statutes, 5 S.C.L.Q. 543 (1953); Letter from
Attorney General Anderson of Kansas to Kansas Law Review, July 16,
1958, in 7 KAN. L. REV. 232 (1958); Comment, 46 J. CRIM L.C. & P.S. 232
(1955); Comment, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 529 (1951); Comment, 25 So. CAL. L.
REv. 68 (1951); 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 279 (1962).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW §4210; OHIO REV. CODE § 313.13 (1958);
WIS. STAT ANN. § 966.121.
3 The form provided by Denver General Hospital is typical:

AUTOPSY AUTHORIZATION
This form is to be filled out in duplicate.
The original must be attached to patient's chart.
The copy is to be retained by the Coroner's Office.
The authorization must be from the nearest relative that is assuming
custody of the body for purposes of burial, as follows:
1. The nearest relative is the father, mother, husband, wife, child, or legal
guardian (but not necessarily in that order).
2. The brothers and sisters who are making burial arrangements in the
event there is no father, mother, husband, wife, child or legal guardian.
3. If there be none of the above individuals, then the next of kin: nieces,
nephews, aunts, uncles, grandchildren and grandparents, etc.
4. If there is no next of kin living, then a friend who is making burial
arrangements.
In the event authorization for post mortem examination is obtained by
letter or telegram, the patient's name and identifying information are to be
completed by the physician, and the letter or telegram of authorization attached
to this form for permanent filing. Any part of this authorization to which the
next of kin will not agree is to be crossed out prior to obtaining signatures.
If an objection to autopsy is received from any person in the same class
as the one consenting, the autopsy will not be performed.
I, the nearest (relative), (friend), assuming custody of the remains for
purposes of burial, do hereby grant Denver General Hospital permission to
perform a post-mortem examination of the body of
It is understood that this permission is given to promote medical knowledge
in order to help others suffering from similar ailments, to insure the pathological cause of death for certificate purposes, and to confirm the medical
diagnosis.
I authorize the removal and retention of such organs or tissues as are
deemed necessary for pathologic diagnosis. I further authorize the hospital to
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dies in the hospital and there are no circumstances which would
interest the coroner, it is usually the attending physician, intern, or
resident physician upon whom the obligation of obtaining the proper consent devolves. He is in the most favorable position to immediately contact the family of the deceased. But in many instances
his task is not as easy as it would appear. The members of the
family of the deceased are not often situated according to the order
of kinship suggested by the usual statutes of descent and distribution. They may be scattered across a wide geographical area, or
they may have distributed various terminal duties among themselves. Consequently a recently deceased man may have a surviving spouse, several adult children, adult and competent brothers
and sisters, and even parents in esse. Where the law requires that
the consent to the private autopsy be given by the one who is
charged with the duty of burial, the harried intern may in fact be
asked to become a legal expert on kinship in order to obtain the
proper signature of authorization. Some hospital forms help him in
this quandary by clearly outlining the order in which the survivors
may grant permission; yet this aid is no panacea, for he must seek
out and obtain a particular signature from the several available.
The problems of proper authorization do not end when the intern or resident fills out the permission form and obtains the appropriate signature. He may be greatly disappointed after his apparent success to find that the pathologist refuses to perform the
autopsy. The pathologist tends to be a cautious, at times skeptical,
critic when the permission form purporting to be a proper authorization is presented to him. The form may be signed, for example,
by "Mary Citizen, sister of the deceased." At this point the pathologist, who may have had a previous tempering in the fire of litigation, should wonder inter alia, if this sister (a) is indeed the sister
of the deceased, (b) if there is not in fact a closer kin who not only
survives but may object to the autopsy and (c) if the parties who
signed the form fully understand the essential nature of the consent they have granted. Some of these points the pathologist learns
provide and forward information relating to the ilness [sic] and death of the
deceased to any and every insurance company which may require same.
I further authorize the Denver General Hospital to take such photographs
as may be necessary and permit the use of such photographs only for publication in scientific and professional journals in connection with medical research
and teaching.
W itness ..............................................

M.D.

Signed ...........
.-.....

................

.............................................................

Approved ------------------------------------A ddress...............................................
Coroner's Office
Relation to Deceased...............................
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS
Denver General Hosnital
AUTOPSY AUTHORIZATION
(Reproduced with the permission of
Robert B. Skinner, M.D.
Manager of Health & Hospitals,
Denver, Colorado)
MED.

REC.

16

(REV.

6/59)

OHH

Date
Ward
Name
Hosp. No.
Age/Sex
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to accept per fidem, encouraged by his repeated instruction to the
constantly changing house physician staff. Comfortingly, the house
physician usually performs properly in his role of "informed consent
obtainer." Unfortunately, the law is far from uniform. It may vary
geographically, as well as according to whether the hospital is public, private, charitable, non-profit, military, or of some other administrative type. As a result, house-physicians may never be quite
certain what the law is on the question of private autopsy consent.
This article is offered in an effort to review some of the underlying common law principles involved and then to outline statutory
regulations which have been enacted in several jurisdictions. Some
legislatures seeking to clarify the law have merely clouded it, while
others have greatly simplified the involved procedures for doctor
and family alike. An attempt will be made to emphasize these distinctions.
CONSENT TO THE PRIVATE AUTOPSY

Under old English law, the protection of the body of a deceased
4

person was reserved exclusively to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Com-

mon law courts recognized no property or property rights in the
body. Byles, J., of The Court of Queen's Bench, in 1867, observed
that
"A dead body by law belongs to no one, and is, therefore,
under the protection of the public. If it lies in consecrated
ground, the ecclesiastical law will interpose for its protection. .

.. "-

This doctrine apparently had its origin in dictum of Lord Coke:
"The buriall of the cadaver (that is caro data vermibus) is nullius
in bonis, and belongs to ecclesiasticall cognisance. .".." It should
be noted that Coke did not assert that no individual can have a
legal interest in a corpse, but only that the matter of sepulture was
the concern of the Church and ecclesiastical courts. The Church
took complete charge of the burial and the custody of the body. The
courts of law had no function in this regard until the repudiation of
the ecclesiastical court. 7
40steen v. Southern Ry., 101 S.C. 532, 86 S.E. 30 (1915); Tyler, American
Ecclesiastical Law § 970 (1866) ; Annot., 82 Am. Dec. 509 (1887).
5 Foster v. Dodd 3 Q.B. 67, 75, (1867).
63 Co. Inst. 203 (1797).
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The American courts have not gone so far as to treat dead
bodies as property in the strict sense. But they have turned to the
time honored concepts of "property rights" in seeking grounds upon
which the sensibilities of the surviving spouse or next of kin could
be protected. In the early case of Meagher v. Driscoll 8 the defendant had exhumed and removed the dead body of the child of the
plaintiff. Holding that the body itself was not property, the court
felt constrained to rely upon the technical trespass to the plaintiff's
land to grant relief. Later cases have rejected the technical requirement of trespass to land as a prerequisite to relief, and have faced
the real issue in a more straightforward manner, holding:
that the right to the possession of a dead body for the purposes of decent burial belongs to those most intimately and
closely connected with the deceased by domestic ties, and
that this is a right which the law will recognize and protect. 9
Judge Mitchell's statement in Larson v. Chase is significant.
[I] t would be a reproach to the law if a plaintiff's right to
recover for mental anguish resulting from the mutilation
or other disturbance of the remains of his dead should be
made to depend upon whether in committing the act the
defendant also committed a technical trespass upon plaintiff's premises, while everybody's common sense would
tell him that the real and substantial wrong was not the
trespass to the land, but the indignity to the dead.'0
This expression of the plaintiff's right to recover for mental anguish is dictum, and ahead of its time. Courts take considerable
time in divesting themselves of traditional concepts. Consequently,
the right to a body for the purpose of burial was treated as a property right in the bulk of the cases which followed. But the courts
did not seem to feel too comfortable in this application:
That there is no right of property in a dead body, using the
word in its ordinary sense, may well be admitted. Yet the
burial of the dead is a subject which interests the feelings
of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters
of actual property. There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind to be discharged by some one towards the dead; a duty, and we may also say a right, to
protect from violation; and a duty on the part of others
to abstain from violation; it may therefore be considered
as a sort of a quasi property, and it would be discreditable
to any system of law not to provide a remedy in such a
case. 1
A later attempt met with a similar feeling of malaise:
It is undoubtedly the law that while a dead body is not cons 99 Mass. 281, 282 (1868). It is of irelevant interest to note that in this old
Massachusetts case, among the conditions for use of the grave site were prohibitions against interring "persons dying in drunkeness, duel, or by self
destruction, unbaptized, non-Catholics, or otherwise opposed to the Catholic
Church."
9 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 309, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (1891).
10 Id. at 312, 50 N.W. at 240.
11Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237 (1872).
(Emphasis added.)
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sidered as property in the technical sense of the word, yet
the law recognizes a right somewhat akin to property, arising out of the duty of the nearest relatives to bury their
dead, which authorizes and requires them to take possession of the dead body for the purpose of burial. The right
is a personal and exclusive right to the custody and possession of the remains, and, in the absence of a testamentary disposition, belongs to the surviving husband or 12wife,
if any, or, if there be none, then to the next of kin.
Dean Prosser is less willing to accept the concept of "property
rights":
[T] he courts have talked of a somewhat dubious "property
right" to the body, usually in the next of kin, which did
not exist while the decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be used only for the one purpose of burial, and
not only has no pecuniary value but is a source of liability
for funeral expenses. It seems reasonably obvious that such
"property" is something evolved out of thin air to meet the
occasion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings of the
survivors which are being protected, under a fiction likely
to deceive no one but a lawyer. 3
Recent cases have recognized with Prosser that the real injury
is to the sensibilities of the survivor, not to any rights of property.
In Darcy v. Presbyterian Hospital,14 the plaintiff mother sued for
damages occasioned by her wounded feelings resulting from an unpermitted autopsy on her twenty year old son. The trial court held
that the complaint did not state a cause of action, but the Court
of Appeals reversed:
[T]he plaintiff, being the mother and nearest surviving
next of kin to the decedent, is entitled to maintain the action and to recover damages for her wounded feelings and
5
mental distress.'
The wounded feelings of the survivor was reaffirmed as a ground
for complaint in McPosey v. Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother.1 6 The
court said:
The wrongful dissection of a dead body is regarded as a
willful and intentional wrong against the person entitled to
the possession and control of the body for burial, and a recovery may be had for the mental anguish resulting from
such a mutilation....
We feel that a petition which alleges the right to a
body, a refusal to deliver up said body on demand, and the
performance of an unauthorized and wrongful dissection
thereon while it is withheld, states a cause of action for
damages for the interference with legal rights, and that
mental anguish is a proper element for such damages. 17
12 Nichols v. Central Vermont Ry., 94 Vt. 14, 109 At]. 905 (1919).

added.)

13 PROSSER, TORTS 51 (3d ed. 1964).
14 202 N.Y. 259, 95 N.E. 695 (1911).
15Id. at 260, 95 N.E. at 696.
18 177 Okla. 52, 57 P.2d 617 (1936).
17 Id. at 53, 54, 57 P.2d at 619.

(Emphasis
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The Kansas Court, in the following year, recognized this right
in the surviving widow to sue for damages based on mental suffering even though she suffered no physical injury.18
The cause of action for an unauthorized autopsy is not one that
can be maintained by any member of the surviving family. In
Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church,19 the parish priest had had
the body moved from one grave to another without permision from
or notification to the plaintiff-husband. Agreeing that this action
on the part of the'priest was unpermitted, the court went on to consider who was the proper party to sue. The court said:
[W] e conceive the rule to be that the surviving spouse
whose duty it is to bury the deceased has the sole right to
sue, during his or her lifetime, for damages due to interference with the dead body. To such a one is intrusted the
duty to guard the dead. True it may be that he may neglect
to exercise such right. Others may then act. Possibly the
surviving members of the deceased's family might join as
plaintiffs (Boyle v. Chandler, 3 w.w.Harr. (Del.) 323, 138
A. 273), but it is inconceivable that each member of the
family could maintain a 2separate
action to recover for
0
mental pain and anguish.
Although this case limits the number of actions to one, the dictum
to the effect that other members of the family may maintain the
action in the event of default or the spouse or next of kin appears
to be unusually liberal. Occasionally more than one kin are permitted to join in the action 21 but this is not the general rule. In
Stephenson v. Duke University, 2 the mother and father joined in
an action for damages arising from the mutilation of the body of
their deceased son. The suit was dismissed as to the mother on the
ground that the father alone had the duty of burial and that therefore he was the only party who could sue for interference with
that right.
Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698, 72 P.2d 981 (1937).
19262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933).
0 Id at 325, 186 N.E. at 800.
21 Boyle v. Chandler, 3 W.W. Harr. (Del.) 323, 138 A. 273 (1927). The surviving husband and children of deceased were allowed to join as party
plaintiffs in an action to recover damages from the undertaker for improper
and indecent burial.
22 202 N.C. 624, 163 S.E. 698 (1932).
18
2

THE PRIVATE AUTOPSY
Similarly in Steagall v. Doctors Hospital,23 it was held that the
right to the possession of the dead body belonged solely to the surviving spouse living with the decedent "in the normal relation of
marriage," and if no spouse be living, "then to the next of kin in
the order of their relation to the decedent . . . ." The court dismissed the appeal of the sons of the decedent who had attempted
to join with their mother as parties plaintiff. If the court can be
believed, it might seem that in the District of Columbia, the intern
or resident seeking a permission signature from the surviving wife
would have to indelicately inquire as to the "normalcy" of her relationship with the decedent. In the brief opinion, Judge Prettyman
did not elaborate on his use of the term "living in the normal relation of marriage."
Although a Canddian case 24 may be understood as giving the
right of possession to the decedent's body to the executor, the
weight of authority in the United States seems to hold that the
executor or administrator has no such rights to the disposition of
the dead body. 25 The court in Simpkins v. Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Co. 26 stated that the administrator of an estate had no
property right in the cadaver of his intestate and could not therefore maintain an action to recover damages for mutilation of the
body.
Under some circumstances the decedent can consent to his own
autopsy. Many states now have statutes allowing a person during
his lifetime to provide for the disposition of his body upon his
death.2 7 Situations have also arisen in which the decedent, while
living, has by contract granted the right to conduct or request 2a
post-mortem examination. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lindsay 8
an insurance contract signed by the decedent contained a clause
authorizing a post-mortem examination at the election of the insuror. The insuror took the additional precaution of obtaining permission from the surviving wife, but was nevertheless sued by the
daughter of the decedent. The court said:
It seems to be recognized in Illinois . . . as well as in other
states . .. that one may make testamentary disposition of
his own body ....
If he may do this by will,
we see no law29
ful objection to his doing it by contract.
30
On the other hand, in American Employer's Liab. Ins. Co. v. Barr,
the court seems to indicate that the beneficiary of the policy rather
23
24
25

171 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
Hunter v. Hunter, 65 Ont. L.R. 586, [1930] 4 D.L.R. 255.
25 C.J.S., Dead Bodies, § 3 (1941). See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Slack, 55 Pac. 906,
123 Cal. 285 (1899), in which the court held that as against the wife of
the decedent, neither the probate court nor the personal (non-related) representative of a decedent has a superior right to his body. There were no
directions in the decedent's will but his widow alleged that the decedent's
"last request" had been to be buried in Ireland; she applied for a court

order to obtain money from the decedent's estate to carry out this last wish
personally.
26200 S.C. 228, 20 S.E.2d 733 (1942).
27 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 91-3-9 (Supp. 1961).
28 69 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1934).
29 Id. at 629.
30 68 Fed. 873 (8th Cir. 1895).
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than the widow was the person entitled to give permission for an
autopsy under the provisions of the policy.
A further complication was introduced in New York for those
attempting to obtain permission to perform an autopsy. In Beller v.
City of New York 3' the court said,
In the absence of a testamentary disposition, the right to
'the possessioh of the body of one who has died belongs to
the surviving husband or wife or next of kin for the purpose of preservation and burial. Any one infringing upon
such right by mutilating the remains without consent of
the person or persons entitled to the possession thereof may
be required to pay damages for the injury to the feelings
and for mental suffering resulting from such unlawful act,
even though no pecuniary damage is alleged or proved.
In its use of "person or persons entitled to the possession" it
would seem that the court, absent the present New York statute;
would have required the permission of more than one person where
more than one were entitled to possession.
In Deeg v. City of Detroit, 2 the husband of the plaintiff was
killed by a city bus. At the direction of a doctor at the city hospital
where the victim died, an autopsy was performed to determine
whether the decedent had been drinking. The wife sued on the
grounds that she had not granted permission for the autopsy. While
the action was pending, the plaintiff-wife also died. The administrator continued the suit and was awarded judgment over defendants' motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the case was reversed
with direction to dismiss. The appellate court said that while the
surviving spouse has an action for an unpermitted autopsy on her
husband's body, the right of action did not survive the death of the
plaintiff-wife.
Further problems arise when the law recognizes the right to
grant permission in the next of kin but fails to indicate a preferred
order among the survivors of that class. A dispute for and against
the autopsy of a widowed parent, when waged between several
adult brothers and sisters, leaves the attending physician and the
pathologist in a quandary. Unfortunately the safer course is usually
elected, the autopsy not performed, and valuable medical knowledge lost.
VARIATION

IN

STATE STATUTES

Recognizing this difficulty, several states have enacted statutes
in an attempt to simplify the procedure by indicating clearly who
is authorized to sign the consent form. Legislatures have proceeded
cautiously in this area, lest the hospital pathologist be given too
much liberty. However, the pathologist's role in the autopsy is not
to inflict needless willful and wanton injury upon the feeling of
the survivors or to mutilate the deceased body. Rather he is charged
with the vital responsibility of determining the cause of death and
the extent of the disease process for the protection of the community and for the advancement of medical knowledge. Those
31 269 App. Div. 643, 58 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1945).
32

345 Mich. 371, 76 N.W.2d 16 (1956).

THE PRIVATE AUTOPSY

statutes which facilitate this important post-mortem investigation
are to be lauded.
A statute prescribing the necessary authorization for private
autopsies should give those concerned with performing the autopsy
a safeguard against suit by members of the family of the decedent,
but should also protect the family's sensibilities. The statute should
be easily read and understood by the nonlegal persons who will be
required to follow it.
An example of a needlessly involved statute is provided by the
Mississippi Code. 38 The power to authorize an autopsy is recognized
as existing in the decedent before death, or in any one of those persons who assume custody for the purposes of burial. However, certain restrictions are included. When the deceased party was a minor, the consent of either parent is deemed sufficient unless the
other parent submits written objection prior to the commencement
of the autopsy. One can envision the pathologist beginning his
autopsy immediately upon receipt of one parent's permission, in
order to foreclose the objecting parent's power to revoke. The Mississippi legislature further provided that no autopsy shall be held
under this section over the objection of a surviving spouse, or absent the spouse, a parent; or absent both spouse and parent, a surviving child. It is submitted that such a provision unnecessarily
complicates the autopsy procedure.
The drafters of Oklahoma's statute34 on the subject failed to
consider that if a law specifically mentions a member of a class, it
is interpreted as specifically omitting those members of the same
class not mentioned. Hence the Oklahoma statutes provide that the
right to dissect the dead body of a human being exists whenever
any husband, or next of kin, of the deceased person so authorizes.
It might be assumed that such a small point as failure to mention
the wife of the decedent would never cause difficulty. However, in
the case of In Re Kyle's Autopsy,' 5 precisely this point was in issue.
The surviving widow granted permission for an autopsy to be performed on her deceased husband. The surviving sisters of the dead
man sued for damages alleging that the statute did not provide for
the widow and that they were "the next of kin." The court held
that such a strict construction of the statute would'be contrary to
any reasonable intention of the legislature. While this result was
33 Miss. CODE § 7158-08 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
34 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1154 (1951).
35 309 P.2d 1070 (Okla. 1957).
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probably equitable and desirable, quaere whether the decision conformed to proper principles of jurisprudence, and whether the
judge should have left it to the legislature to correct an improper
statute.
The statutes of Nevada 36 and North Dakota, 37 in provisions
similar to the Oklahoma one, specificallly include the wife with the
husband and next of kin.
Wyoming38 provided that the autopsy could be authorized by
the "nearest living kin of deceased." This constitutes an unfortunate narrowing of the common law. Requiring a search for the nearest relative rather than either a nearby kin or a non-relative who
has assumed the burial duties places an undue burden on the doctor seeking the permission.
Several states have recognized the right of a person, before
he dies, to authorize a private autopsy. Unless the statute provides
for recognition of a defective testamentary instrument for the purpose, it probably adds little. It seems clear that all jurisdictions
would uphold a valid testament in which the testator gives directions for his own autopsy, and to which there were no objections
by survivors.
Some states approve non-testamentary instruments executed
by its deceased to authorize an autopsy. The Montana statute is
an example:
The right to perform an autopsy upon, or to dissect the
dead body of a human being, or make any post-mortem
examination involving dissection of any part of such body,
shall be limited to the following cases, viz: .

.

. (c) cases

where dissection, autopsy or post-mortem examination is
directed or authorized by the last will and testament, or
codicil thereto or other written statement of the deceased,
whether such statement be of testamentary character or
otherwise .... 39
This apparently includes the standard hospital autopsy form when
signed by the decedent prior to death, even though it usually will
not meet the requirements of a will.
Kentucky 40 provides, inter alia, that the autopsy will be authorized, ".

.

. whenever written consent thereto, duly signed and

acknowledged prior to his death, has been granted by the deceased."
In New Jersey 41 the medical director of an institution may,
with the approval of the board of managers of that institution,
authorize an autopsy on an indigent patient to determine the cause
of death or the cause of mental ailment. The statute makes no mention of the decedent's family whose objections presumably could
be disregarded. 42
New Mexico allows the state department of public health to
authorize the dissection of a decedent's body in the absence of
36

NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 451.010 (1957).

37 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06-13 (1959).
38 Wyo. STAT. § 6-100 (1957).
39 MONT. REV. CODE § 69-2308 (1947).

40 Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 72.070(2) (1960).
41 N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 30: 4-104 (1964).
42 N.M. STAT. § 12-7-7 (1953).
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surviving relatives. The statute allows the anatomical or pathological department of a properly incorporated hospital, school or college
to perform the autopsy. Connecticut

43

also provides that where

there has been a fruitless but diligent search for surviving relatives
or, in their absence, a friend assuming the burial duties, an autopsy
may nonetheless be performed without liability provided that not
less than 12 hours nor more than 48 hours has elapsed from time of
death. Measures like the New Mexico and Connecticut ones, which
provide the medical staff with a legitimate method of securing an
autopsy where the relatives and friends are not found after reasonable search are commendable. The autopsy to have maximum value
as an educational aide or protection for the community should be
performed without undue delay.
The Montana Code provides that where the decedent died in a
state-operated institution, and left no relatives charged with the
duty of burial, the superintendent of that institution may apply for
an order from the district court to authorize the autopsy. 44 This

method may be too cumbersome to be practical.
The Tennessee Code, 45 The Michigan Statutes, 46 The Wisconsin
Statutes 47 and the Colorado Revised Statutes 48 all provide a simple
and apparently workable method for obtaining proper permission
to perform an autopsy while safeguarding the rights of those parties interested. With minor variations, each of these brief, clearly
worded statutes provides that the father, mother, husband, wife,
guardian, next of kin, or in the absence of the foregoing, a friend or
agency which is assuming the responsibility for burial, may authorize an autopsy. They further provide that if two or more of the
above persons assume custody of the body, consent of one of them
is sufficient. These statutes provide a reasonable and workable
method of coping with the autopsy permission problems in our
modern hospitals.
Some states have failed to provide any statutory mechanism
by which the citizens of those states may authorize an autopsy. In
these states the common law prevails. With the increased ease of
travel from one state to another persons with few or little remembered relatives, or none, often die in distant hospitals. Where the
staff doctors, interns, residents and students have contributed time,
energy and talent to provide medical treatment for these unfortunate souls, the state legislature should make it easier, rather than
more difficult, to obtain a proper authorization for post-mortem
examinations. The future of medicine itself depends on the dissemination of knowledge and the opportunity to learn. A state which
hampers these ends through a particularly difficult autopsy permission statute should re-examine it to see if it can better protect
the interests of its citizens. It is submitted that the rights of the
people are ultimately better protected by the liberal autopsy statute
than those which stifle medical research by a virtual prohibition of
post-mortem investigation.
43
JOHN R. FEEGEL, M.D.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-143 (1958).
44MONT. REv. CODE § 69-2308 (1947).
45 TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-513 (Supp. 1964).
46
MICE STAT. ANN. § 14.524 (1956).
47

WIS. STAT. ANN.
48 COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 155:05 (1957).
§ 91-1-33 (Supp. 1960).
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COMMENT
EMINENT DOMAIN -PROCEEDINGS
-USE

To ASSESS COMPENSATION

OF COMMISSIONS IN FEDERAL CONDEMNATION ACTIONS.

In a condemnation action brought by the United States, a commission was appointed by the district court to determine the issue
of just compensation pursuant to Rule 71A (h) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.' The report submitted by the commission to
the court listed only a dollar figure of "Damages Assessed" for each
tract of land involved. The United States objected that the report
was inadequate, whereupon it was apparently informally returned
to the commission. A supplemental report, which set out more
fully the conclusions of the commission, was then filed. The district2
court adopted the reports over the objection of the United States.
On review the Supreme Court of the United States held the reports
to be inadequate because they did not show the reasoning used by
the commission in arriving at its conclusions; no sufficient basis
existed upon which to decide whether the reports were "clearly
erroneous" within the meaning of Rule 53 (e) (2); and detailed instructions as to the commission's duties should have been given by
the district court. United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192 (1964).
[A]ny party may have a trial by
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A(h): "TRIAL....
jury of the issue of just compensation by filing a demand therefor within
the time allowed for answer or within such further time as the court may
fix, unless the court in its discretion orders that, because of the character,
location, or quantity of the property to be condemned, or for other reasons
in the interest of justice, the issue of compensation shall be determined by
a commnission of three persons appointed by it. If a commission is appointed
it shall have the powers of a master provided in subdivision (c) of Rule 53
and proceedings before it shall be governed by the provisions of paragraphs
(1) and (2) of subdivision (d) of Rule 53. Its action and report shall be
determined by a majority and its findings and report shall have the effect,
and be dealt with by the court in accordance with the practice, prescribed
in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Rule 53 .... "
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (c): "PowERs.... Subject to the specifications and
limitations stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise the power
to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and
take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his
duties under the order. He may require the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in the reference, including the production
of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings applicable thereto.
He may rule upon the admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed
by the order of reference and has the authority to put witnesses on oath
and may himself examine them and may call the parties to the action and
examine them upon oath. When a party so requests, the master shall make
a record of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner and
subject to the same limitations as provided in Rule 43(c) for a court sitting
without a jury."
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (d) of Rule 53 deal with time
and place of meetings and powers to subpoena witnesses and punish for
contempt.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e) : "REPORT. . . . (2) In Non-Jury Actions. In an
action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept the master's findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous . . . . The court after hearing may adopt
the report or may modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or may
receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions."
2 In affirming, the Court of Appeals for The Tenth Circuit held: (1) findings as to the amount of the award must be accepted on appeal if such
are within the range of conflicting testimony and not "clearly erroneous";
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Under the provisions of the general condemnation statute, s
before the adoption of Rule 71A, it was the practice in federal
condemnation suits to conform to the procedure of the state in
which such actions were brought, 4 with two exceptions. 5 This practice continued after the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, since no rule specifically governed condemnation.6 However, experience showed the need for a uniform rule relating to
federal proceedings in eminent domain.7 The result of this need
was the subsequent adoption of Rule 71A,8 which became effective
August 1, 1951.
The purpose of Rule 71A is to displace local conformity in
favor of national uniformity by a single standard in federal con(2) whether such a report is sufficiently comprehensive to provide a basis
for review depends upon the nature of the matter involved; and (3) thcommission's general findings were sufficient in view of the uncomplicated
nature of the issues and evidence heard. United States v. Merz, 306 F.2d
39 (10th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 192 (1964).
3 Act of August 1, 1888, c. 728, § 2, 25 Stat. 357.
4Ibid.; United States v. City of New York, 165 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1948);
Comparet v. United States, 164 F.2d 452 (10th Cir. 1947); United States
v. A Certain ,Tract of Land, 72 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1934) ; 7 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 2709, 2716 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. California v. United States, 169 F.2d
914 (9th Cir. 1948); Nebraska v. United States, 164 F.2d 866 (8th Cir.
1947), cert denied, 334 U.S. 815 (1948) (prior to adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P.
71A (h), what constitutes property and what is just compensation in condemnation by United States not question of state law but of federal law);
United States v. Kansas City, Kansas, 159 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1946)
(appeal by the government from order in condemnation proceedings governed by federal law under former Rule 81 (a) (7), prior to adoption of Rule
71A); Murphy v. United States, 145 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 891 (1945); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
5 Condemnation proceedings under Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat.
70 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831x (1958) ; and acquisition by the District of
Columbia, D.C. CODE, §§ 16-619 to 16-144 (1961).
6 The inherent power of the Federal Government to condemn and acquire
property in its own right was firmly established by Kohl v. United States,
91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875). By the Condemnation Act, supra note 3, Congress
gave the federal courts jurisdiction in federal condemnation cases and
provided that the procedure in such cases conform as nearly as possible to
state practices.
7 Nealy, Rule 71A (h) in Federal Condemnation Proceedings, 23 FED. B.J.
45, 47, 48 (1963) ; 7 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 4 at 2717, 2744.
8
Supra note 1.
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demnation proceedings." Since local conformity had been the practice in federal condemnation actions, there was necessarily an
absence of uniform authority on the many procedural problems
-raised by the promulgation of Rule 71A. 10 There are few cases
which bear upon the procedure to be followed by a commission
during its hearings and, prior to Merz, apparently none dealing
directly with the kind and extent of instructions to be given the
commission by the court. Early cases suggested that the commission
should not follow the exclusionary rules of evidence but should
hear all evidence offered, preserve it in the record, indicate what
use, if any, had been made of the evidence, and allow the court to
rule later on such matters.1 Merz clarifies commission procedure
by enumerating certain minimum standards to be followed by the
court in instructing a commission. 12 Instructions should be given
on the method of conducting the hearing, including instructions on
the kind of evidence that is admissible and the manner of ruling
on it. The court should explain in detail the qualifications of expert
witnesses, the weight to be given other opinion evidence, what is
9 United States v. Merchants Matrix Cut Syndicate, 219 F.2d 90, 93 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955); United States v. Wallace, 201 F.2d
65, 67 (10th Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
10 One of the problems encountered by district judges in applying the rule
has been that of deciding when to appoint a commission. It was the apparent
intention of the draftsmen of the rule that commissions should be used
only in exceptional and extraordinary cases and where, because of peculiar
circumstances, jury trial was inadvisable. 7 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 2711, 2790, 2797. But widespread, sometimes indiscriminate, use of commissions has been the practice in many areas. Nealy, supra note 7 at 46.
For representative cases concerning reference to commissions, see United
States v. Leavell & Ponder, Inc., 286 F.2d 398, 407, 409 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 944 (1961); United States v. Hall, 274 F.2d 856, 858 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960); Cunningham v. United States, 270
F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 989 (1960); United States
v. Vater, 259 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Buhler, 254
F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Bobinski, 244 F.2d 299
(2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Theimer, 199 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1952);
United States v. Wallace, 201 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1952).
Some other problems encountered in the use of commissions are indicated in the following cases: Unwarranted use of masters is an "effective
way of putting a case to sleep for an indefinite period." LaBuy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 253, n. 5 (1957). See United States v. Bobinski,
supra at 301, saying, "Certainly the misadventures of this case . . . do
not speak well for a course substantially repudiated in the state as well
as federal procedure."
" . . . [T]he appointment of the 'commission created far more problems
than it solved, problems that ultimately required the court to perform a
painful salvage operation in order to dispose of the case." United States v.
Vater, supra at 671.
" . . . [A]mong other things a reference to a commission tends unduly
to prolong the proceedings, thereby causing vexation to all concerned and
additional expense, in this instance to the government for accruing interest."
United States v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 264 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1959);
see United States v. 44.00 Acres of Land, 234 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1956)
(Interest does not accrue on that portion of the value of condemned propto the Declaration of Taking
erty that is deposited with the court pursuant
2
Act, 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 58a (1958).)
11 United States v. Cunningham, 246 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1957); see United
States v. Southerly Portion of Bodie Island, 19 F.R.D. 313 (E.D.N.C. 1956)
(within discretion of commission whether to rule on admissibility of evidence unless instructed otherwise by court).
12 United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 198 (1964).
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competent evidence of value, and the best evidence of value.
Examples illustrating severance damages should be given, and the
right to view the property and the limited purpose of viewing
should be explained.'5 Rules 71A (h) and 53(e) (2) provide that
the commission shall make a report to the district court, which will
review the commission's findings
of fact in accordance with the
"clearly erroneous" standard.' 4 To what extent the report, as a basis
for the court's review, should state specific subsidiary findings of
fact has been in conflict. Decisions in several- circuits recognized the
need for specific findings but did not set forth any uniform standard to be used.' 5 In two Fifth Circuit cases commission reports
were rejected as inadequate for review because they neither showed
how the commission resolved conflicts in testimony nor made any
findings as to particular benefits.16 But other decisions established
a lesser standard for report comprehensiveness.' 7 Merz indicates
Is Ibid.
14 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); See
note 1 supra.
15 Louis Gill & Sons v. United States, 313 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Lewis, 307 F.2d 453, 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v.
2872.88 Acres in Clay and Quitman Counties, 310 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. granted, 372 U.S. 975 (1963) (decided with the principal case) ; United
States v. Carroll, 304 F.2d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Leavell & Ponder, Inc., 286 F.2d 398, 406 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 366 U.S.
944 (1961) ; United States v. 2477.79 Acres in Bell County, 259 F.2d 23, 29
(5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Cunningham, 246 F.2d 330, 333 (4th Cir.
1957) ; United States v. Bobinski, 244 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1957) ; United States
v. 44.00 Acres of Land, 234 F.2d 410, 411, 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1956) ; United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Philadelphia, 215 F.2d 140, 142, 144
(3d Cir. 1954).
16 United States v. 2872.88 Acres in Clay and Quitman Counties, supra note
15; United States v. 2477.79 Acres in Bell County, supra note 15. (Report
inadequate for review which showed no basis for resolving conflicts in
testimony before commissioners).
17 United States v. Lewis, 307 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Cunningham, 246 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1957) (report sufficient though it did
not show the "path" taken through the evidence); United States v. 3065.94
Acres of Land, 187 F.Supp. 728 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (commission report not
required to tell what use was made of testimony or what facts were considered by commission); United States v. Southerly Portion of Bodie Island,
19 F.R.D. 313 (E.D.N.C. 1956) (since commission chairman was a lawyer,
court assumed its instructions had been followed though no such showing
made in report); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Warren
County, 90 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Va. 1949) (report not to be interfered with
unless prejudice, corruption, or clear mistake of law or fact appears).
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that commissioners should be instructed on the kind of report to
be filed and what kind of findings should be included.18 Though
the findings do not have to be as detailed as would those made by
a judge trying a case without a jury, they must reveal at a minimum the reasoning used in deciding on the award, the standards
followed, the testimony believed, and the measure of severance
damages used. 19
The Merz decision, while recognizing that commissions may be
utilized advantageously, 20 should curtail the "free-wheeling" tendency of commissioners to use their own expertise instead of acting
merely as a "deliberative body applying constitutional standards. "
Left largely unsettled are the problems created by the provision
in Rule 53 (e) (2) allowing courts to adopt, modify, or reject reports in whole or in part, or to receive further evidence, or to recommit them to the commission in whole or in part with instructions. Obviously the court has wide discretion in deciding which of
these courses of action to follow and may tailor its decision to the
facts of the case. The admonition that the court "shall accept the
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous" is open to
several possible interpretations. Courts in non-condemnation cases
have sometimes treated a master's findings as advisory only and
have not felt bound by a master's conclusions of law. 22 This treat-

ment has carried over somewhat into condemnation cases. As one
court viewed the matter:
It was; the purpose of the rule, where there is a trial
without a jury, to place 'ultimate responsibility for the findings of fact upon the judge. Where there has been a reference to a master, the master's findings are entitled to
special weight because he has seen and heard the witnesses
but they are not given the effect of a verdict by a jury.
The language of the rule is that the court shall accept the
master's findings unless clearly erroneous. This is manifestly a guide to be followed in the exercise of the discretion vested in the District Judge, not a limitation upon his
power ....23
The Supreme Court has said "a finding is 'clearly erroneous'
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed." 24 Here the Court was talking
about an appellate court's review of a lower court decision under
Rule 52 (a). In condemnation proceedings some courts have applied
the rule in a somewhat narrower fashion. Thus it has been stated
that the district court should determine whether the commission
has followed the instructions of the court as to admissibility and
18 376 U.S. at 198.
19 Id. at 198.
20 Id. at 197.
21 Id.at 198.
22 D.M.W. Contracting Co. v. Stolz, 158 F.2d 405, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947); ef. United States v. Waymire, 202 F.2d 550,

553 (10th Cir. 1953).

23
24

.

United States v. Twin City Power Co., 248 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958).
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
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consideration of testimony offered and decide whether it has
25
overstepped its guidelines and prerogatives in this respect.
But as stated by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the report should be adopted unless it is "clearly erroneous" in whole
or in part based on substantial error in the proceedings; 26 or, based
upon a misapplication of controlling law; 2 7 or, because it is not
supported by substantial evidence; 2 or, because-it is contrary to
the clear weight of the evidence.2 9 It has also been stated that a
district court may not reject a commission report merely because
it disagrees with the result reached or would have personally
decided differently on the evidence presented.8 0
Once a report or a portion thereof has been rejected as "clearly erroneous," the court is faced with the problem of deciding what
course of action will bring the case to a fair and rapid conclusion.
Much confusion has resulted from the interpretation of Rule
53 (e) (2) to provide the court with power to modify the master's
findings. The United States has consistently contended that modification by the court without further proceedings may be exercised,
if at all, only to a very limited degree. It points out the difference
between the findings of the commission and its report. Findings
are made on the basis of testimony given before the commission by
witnesses whose credibility it was able to judge first-hand. The
United States' contention is that the commission report, and the reUnited States v. 10064.97 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 393 (D. Wyo. 1952).
(10th Cir. 1953). See United
States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 154 F. Supp. 770, 775 (M.D. Pa. 1957); cf.
I-XL Eastern Furniture Co. v. Holly Hill Lumber Co., 134 F. Supp. 343
(E.D.S.C. 1955).
27 United States v. Waynire, supra note 26 at 553.
25

26 United States v. Waymire, 202 F.2d 550, 553

28

Ibid.

30 United States v. Rainwater, 325 F.2d 62, 66 (8th Cir. 1963) ; United States

v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 154 F. Supp. 770, 775 (M.D. Pa. 1957). See United
States v. Twin City Power Co., 253 F.2d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 1958), wherein
the court states: "[The clearly erroneous] ... burden is especially strong
when the commission has viewed and inspected the properties, or when
credibility is questioned and the commission has had the opportunity to see
and hear the witnesses, and is lighter when inferences for and deductions
from opinion evidence may be drawn as well by the district court Posby the
commission, and still lighter when the appellate court in turn reviews the
inferences drawn by the district court from the written transcript of evidence, though the 'clearly erroneous' rule is still applicable. (Citation omitted.)"
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port only, should be modified; and such modification may extend
31
only to the correction of an error of law.

If the court seeks to

make contrary findings there must be further proceedings either
before the court or before the commission. 32 The commission is
seen by the United States as an independent entity whose findings
ought to have at least the effect of those of a jury and should not
be overturned by a reviewing body. 3' This position has heretofore
received little support from the courts. Most courts have preferred
to allow more or less wide discretion in modification. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted the following position:
Although the Commission's findings of fact must be accepted by the district court unless they are clearly erroneous ....

the district court is authorized by the Rule to

modify or reject the Commission's findings in whole or in
part. We do not think the power to modify is to be narrowly construed or applied ....

The district court could have

rejected the Commission's findings had they been clearly
erroneous. Had this been done, the district court could
have substituted its own findings based upon the evidence
before the Commission .

. .

. We think the district court

could properly accept and approve the Commission's findings and modify and supplement
them by making further
34
findings from the evidence.
The same court found that witness credibility could be judged as
well by a district judge from the record as by members of a commission.3 5 The Drinciple that "one who decides must hear" renders
the wisdom of this pronouncement questionable.36 A seemingly
middle-of-the-road approach is taken by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in a recent case wherein the court retreats from
the broad position previously adopted. 3T In United States v. Car3

roll,

that court states:
... [I] f there is evidence in the record before

8

...

[the

district judge] from which a correct ultimate decision can
be made and which does not involve a determination upon
conflicting testimony of questions of fact [Footnote omitted.] (as distinguished from a determination of an issue
the resolution of which depends on informed opinion and
judgment evidence), [the district judge may] make the
necessary determinations himself and enter final judgment
3 Brief for Appellant, pp. 13-17, United States v. Carroll, 304 F.2d 300 (4th

Cir. 1962) ; Reply brief for Appellant, pp. 4-7, United States v. Rainwater,
325 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Brief for Petitioner, pp. 26-30, United States
v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192 (1964).
32 Brief for Appellant, p. 40, United States v. Certain Lands in the City of
Statesboro, Docket No. 21039, 5th Cir., case presently pending.
33 Briefs cited note 31 supra.
34 United States v. Tampa Bay Garden Apartments, 294 F.2d 598, 603

(5tb
Cir. 1961).
a United States v. Twin City Power Co., 253 F.2d 197, 204 (5th Cir. 1958).
36 See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1935).
37 See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 248 F.2d 108, 112
(4th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958), wherein the former position
of this circuit is stated.
38 304 F.2d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 1962).

COMMENT

rather than remand the case for further proceedings before
the commission.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in United States
v. Rainwater,39 held that a judge was not permitted to substitute
his judgment for that of a commission and thereby increase the
award on the ground that it was inadequate. The case was remanded with direction to enter judgment in the amount awarded
by the commission. This seems to suggest that modification of the
award by the court is not proper. However, since the Court of
Appeals felt that the district court was wrong in finding the
report clearly erroneous, the case is questionable authority for the
proposition that a court may not modify. The majority opinion
suggests and the dissent states that a judge might hear additional
evidence and then nmodify the award in light of the record made
before the commission and the additional evidence. 40 It should be
kept in mind that the views stated in all the above cases were those
of courts considering commission reports prior to Merz, reports
that may have often been inadequate. Merz, however, does not
seem to support the United States' contention that the court should
remand with instructions to the commission, take additional evidence, or begin anew rather than resort to modification. The
Court authorizes modification and mentions several cases in which
modification of reports has been approved. 41 Merz qualified its
39
40

325 F.2d 62, 66 (8th Cir. 1963).

Id. at 67.

41376 U.S. at 200, nn. 5 & 6, referring to United States v. 44 Acres of Land,

234 F.2d 410, 414 (2d Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Carroll, 304 F.2d 300,
303 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Certain Interests in Property

296 F.2d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
248 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958). In
United States v. 44 Acres of Land, the Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit
says at page 414: "Rule 71A(h), together with Rule 53(e) (2) gave the
judge authority to reject, in part, a finding of the Commissioners if 'clearly
erroneous' and to modify their award accordingly. He was not obliged to,
although he had discretion to, remand their report to the Commissioners
for a revised finding." See also United States v. Twin City Power Co., 253
F.2d 197, 204 (5th Cir. 1958) (remand not necessary; protracted litigation
may be concluded by the court).
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approval of modification based on the existing record with the
language "in light of the exigencies of the particular case,"42 indicating that normal procedure should be to resubmit to the commission except in cases, such as those in which there has already been
extremely protracted litigation and one or more appeals, when
justice will be better accomplished by ending the case expeditiously.
Another question upon which Merz sheds some light is whether
the court of appeals reviews the report of the commission or the
judgment of the district court. Prior to Merz most courts held it
was the judgment of the district court and not the commission
report that was reviewed. 43 The Department of Justice now argues
that Merz rejects this position and holds that courts of appeal
review the findings of the commission just as the district court
does.44 The Supreme Court, after setting down its requirements
for adequate commission reports, stated:
If those procedures are followed and the District Court
adopts the report, as it may under Rule 53 (e) (2), the Court
of Appeals will have some guide lines to help it determine
whether the report is "clearly erroneous" within
the mean45
ing of Rule 53 (e) (2). (Emphasis supplied.)
That courts of appeal must review the commission report seems
manifest from a practical standpoint. While, technically, it is the
judgment entered by the district court from which an appeal is
taken,4 6 it would be difficult, if not impossible, for an appellate
tribunal to tell whether the district court's disposition of a commission report was correct unless it considered that report contemporaneously with the district court judgment.
Merz established certain minimum standards to which commissions must adhere, particularly with respect to the commission's
report to the court. But the opinion only suggests possible solutions
or alternatives to the problems of scope of review by district courts
and courts of appeal,- and procedures for remedial action when a
district court finds a commission report inadequate. It is still the
district court which has the ultimate responsibility for determining
the issue of just compensation, though it may choose a commission
as the means for making this determination. Merz emphasizes that
the court must exercise such supervision over a commission so as
to insure that its responsibility is not relinquished.
WILLIAM E. GANDY
42 376 U.S. at 200.
43 United States v. Twin City Power Co., 248 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 918 (1958); Parks v. United States, 293 F.2d 482,
485 (5th Cir. 1961); see United States v. Benning, 330 F.2d 527, 530 (9th
Cir. 1964), wherein the court adhered to the stated rule but nevertheless
reviewed the commission report instead of remanding to the district court in
order to dispose of the case without prolonging the already lengthy litigation.
But cf. O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir.
1961), saying that the clearly erroneous standard was to be applied on

appeal to a referee's findings and not to those of the district court.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 35-38, United States v. Certain Lands in the City
of Statesboro, Docket No. 21439, 5th Cir., case presently pending.
45 376 U.S. at 199.
46See Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a).
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